%PDF-1.3 % 1 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 10 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F4 8 0 R /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R6 112 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 113 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 2 0 obj << /Type /Catalog /Pages 41 0 R /AGFA_PSE_V (Apogee Norm PSE 1.1 15) /AGFA_NORN_V (ES15.101 V09 Mac) /JT 110 0 R /PageLabels 101 0 R >> endobj 5 0 obj << /Type /Font /Subtype /Type1 /FirstChar 32 /LastChar 181 /Widths [ 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 ] /Encoding /WinAnsiEncoding /BaseFont /Courier /FontDescriptor 92 0 R >> endobj 6 0 obj << /Type /Font /Subtype /Type1 /FirstChar 32 /LastChar 240 /Widths [ 287 296 370 574 574 908 815 204 352 352 426 574 287 333 287 389 574 574 574 574 574 574 574 574 574 574 287 287 574 574 574 463 759 684 617 741 786 575 520 796 797 349 349 668 574 963 796 815 575 815 631 500 611 779 721 1056 759 647 593 333 574 333 574 500 352 509 587 485 604 495 347 537 658 310 315 551 310 946 658 592 607 608 385 407 370 611 557 795 573 556 470 333 259 333 574 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 592 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 574 574 0 0 0 0 0 778 0 0 0 250 0 0 250 574 250 250 0 630 250 250 250 250 250 0 0 250 778 0 0 0 0 250 0 250 250 0 0 0 287 0 0 0 0 0 500 0 500 500 278 278 0 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 623 623 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 250 ] /Encoding /MacRomanEncoding /BaseFont /StoneSerif /FontDescriptor 94 0 R >> endobj 7 0 obj << /Type /Font /Subtype /Type1 /FirstChar 32 /LastChar 240 /Widths [ 287 315 370 574 574 907 759 278 333 333 500 574 287 333 287 333 574 574 574 574 574 574 574 574 574 574 287 287 574 574 574 463 759 685 612 704 776 574 537 741 758 330 330 666 573 889 759 741 568 741 610 481 648 701 722 1074 741 648 648 333 574 333 574 500 352 538 537 421 537 425 333 463 574 296 278 500 296 856 574 499 519 518 349 407 333 556 481 741 519 481 474 333 278 333 574 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 538 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 574 574 0 0 0 0 0 778 0 0 0 250 0 0 250 574 250 250 0 556 250 250 250 250 250 0 0 250 0 0 0 0 0 250 0 250 250 0 0 0 287 0 0 0 0 0 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 606 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 250 ] /Encoding /MacRomanEncoding /BaseFont /StoneSerif-Italic /FontDescriptor 96 0 R >> endobj 8 0 obj << /Type /Font /Subtype /Type1 /FirstChar 32 /LastChar 181 /Widths [ 296 315 407 593 593 944 796 222 370 370 426 593 296 336 296 463 593 593 593 593 593 593 593 593 593 593 296 296 593 593 593 481 796 722 673 741 812 630 539 796 833 391 389 703 629 981 796 815 629 815 685 538 648 796 741 1075 778 703 630 352 574 352 593 500 389 557 625 519 645 517 389 574 685 344 312 630 344 997 685 611 644 627 426 425 393 644 593 869 629 593 508 352 333 352 593 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 593 593 250 250 250 250 250 760 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 593 250 250 250 648 ] /Encoding /WinAnsiEncoding /BaseFont /StoneSerif-Semibold /FontDescriptor 98 0 R >> endobj 9 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op false /OPM 1 >> endobj 10 0 obj << /Type /Pages /Kids [ 1 0 R 11 0 R 14 0 R 17 0 R 20 0 R 23 0 R 26 0 R 29 0 R 32 0 R 35 0 R ] /Count 10 /Parent 41 0 R >> endobj 11 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 10 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F4 8 0 R /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R20 115 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 116 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 14 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 10 0 R /Resources << /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R4 118 0 R >> /Font << /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 119 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 17 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 10 0 R /Resources << /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R1 121 0 R >> /Font << /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 122 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 20 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 10 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F4 8 0 R /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R17 124 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 125 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 23 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 10 0 R /Resources << /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R8 127 0 R >> /Font << /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 128 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 26 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 10 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F4 8 0 R /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R7 130 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 131 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 29 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 10 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F4 8 0 R /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R3 133 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 134 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 32 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 10 0 R /Resources << /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R11 136 0 R >> /Font << /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 137 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 35 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 10 0 R /Resources << /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R76 139 0 R >> /Font << /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 140 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 38 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 42 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F4 8 0 R /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R9 142 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 143 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 41 0 obj << /Type /Pages /Kids [ 10 0 R 42 0 R 73 0 R ] /Count 27 /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] >> endobj 42 0 obj << /Type /Pages /Kids [ 38 0 R 43 0 R 46 0 R 49 0 R 52 0 R 55 0 R 58 0 R 61 0 R 64 0 R 67 0 R ] /Count 10 /Parent 41 0 R >> endobj 43 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 42 0 R /Resources << /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R14 145 0 R >> /Font << /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 146 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 46 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 42 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F4 8 0 R /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R13 148 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 149 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 49 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 42 0 R /Resources << /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R5 151 0 R >> /Font << /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 152 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 52 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 42 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F4 8 0 R /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R21 154 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 155 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 55 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 42 0 R /Resources << /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R28 157 0 R >> /Font << /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 158 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 58 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 42 0 R /Resources << /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R16 160 0 R >> /Font << /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 161 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 61 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 42 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F4 8 0 R /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R12 163 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 164 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 64 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 42 0 R /Resources << /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R38 166 0 R >> /Font << /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 167 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 67 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 42 0 R /Resources << /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R19 169 0 R >> /Font << /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 170 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 70 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 73 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F4 8 0 R /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R15 172 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 173 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 73 0 obj << /Type /Pages /Kids [ 70 0 R 74 0 R 77 0 R 80 0 R 83 0 R 86 0 R 89 0 R ] /Count 7 /Parent 41 0 R >> endobj 74 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 73 0 R /Resources << /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R10 175 0 R >> /Font << /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 176 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 77 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 73 0 R /Resources << /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R79 178 0 R >> /Font << /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 179 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 80 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 73 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F4 8 0 R /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R56 181 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 182 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 83 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 73 0 R /Resources << /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R95 184 0 R >> /Font << /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 185 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 86 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 73 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F4 8 0 R /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R2 187 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 188 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 89 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 73 0 R /Resources << /ExtGState << /R18 9 0 R /R86 190 0 R >> /Font << /F3 7 0 R /F2 6 0 R /F-1 5 0 R >> /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] >> /Contents 191 0 R /ArtBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /BleedBox [ 18 18 553 762 ] /TrimBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] /MediaBox [ 0 0 571 780 ] /CropBox [ 54 54 517 726 ] >> endobj 92 0 obj << /Type /FontDescriptor /Ascent 625 /CapHeight 565 /Descent -145 /Flags 34 /FontBBox [ -28 -250 628 805 ] /FontName /Courier /ItalicAngle 0 /StemV 51 /XHeight 445 /FontFile3 93 0 R >> endobj 93 0 obj << /Length 16282 /Subtype /Type1C >> stream Courier8;<== = o NU?s#&(26?CIPTVahlns|"formatScedillataboverscoreIJarrowleftLLarrowrightliraarrowbothstopindentgrayboxIdotllnotegraphicarrowupdownijmergearrowdownreturnupprescriptionsquarelargebulletcenterdectabGcarongcaronscedillaleft002.004Copyright (c) 1989, 1990, 1991 Adobe Systems Incorporated. All rights reserved.Courier7^5Wq+vff'Hg_   O / o 2 w  D2u.Gy.y/\w#T9u[JXl&[{M_ & G ^ !,!":"S"l"""##=#r##$$E$g$x$%Z%&&~&'b''(6()<)`)v)*,*~*+)+v+,,9,r,-q-.j.|//A/0V0]0d0k0r0y010171>1E1L1S1Z1a1h1o1v1}11111111111111111222222222222222233 333!3(3/3C454L4^445,5Q66?6U6y7`778A8k88949[9r9::9:X:s:::;;|pw*73,ivkkkkvh~WO~~~~RNgg޻ggkr&q[~q q[~q[&[~rr~r7& Ow*7<^-Z)hqVJL}assswxxِZ10֨uV_o}|ur|RRܺĺ H>=᳧;;SݳݱճݳݰH>=᳧;;Sݳݱճݳݰ3Mb4Mgܷɲ:Եl_աTҰcWBղ<9O͸xN kVqudoTPg̻wi7A~~wL/Q++/OYwf+Q+LYYOwX+b*k*+z'U1U1'|jOVXVPPWWO~I7A~~{U|y"ghhgsees wI DvD|W>>T<wr>==]\k\k|=+KO\JY\q&?Ka}wQivkkkkvh|a&Bؾܾ9/RG0(/ V+ƐzaUJt&KoIu8F!T1GbgavZxhln̹eeff8H&[fSgr[%WfT[e#H}o[y3[S>ßV [# LkPO^D0o!+ 8y|ww~vw|WfK (2`6#PٮngZNl=#> B Yf:[F!)S [4 aKq%wMo[!;`H|[f3[I\o;AX[A;[o[!;o;AX[A;[H|[f3y:|wwa[,wXT|R6NHO%̓]vw|WfQ(2`6#IР=o[>[a>oo>[a>fػa[[[ػa[f[GfG[,FfFyuK[^ rR&$LZnlm8fC\ƻ\[w[f3[w33m Z:*bh[@f)[f%[Z}[ffܾػ::[f>{$ѻ,,${>]ڻپջ<[xf6[gy$-0&::0&--&::&-]""Q""Q?99f5[*?T lA[l0XzAvv$J|r~qsspnqog{z3&--0&::0&-^! jplnkgtdU""Q""Qcg7[w/c^9 4ui0ے~%[:=sq8ypvwwtɺdd2kkjrqruā -C6ظۺ}lqhncr{ye``$I%H1TՅۇ2q38%GfII8z~SBf[fBSyuо^ui>wEջwʭnnn˻nLMn\ʭѻ|OO;;Oڲ;;ѻ[[pط8np"6k6k"pRR:nǻ[MMܻ[ѻھ[,,ֻ[J<[<LfٻQ!cX@b[2hNOAnA w  KK[AnA[w0bbn>]>]wt7t~A~|gJȾ|i:DLxsQ]ɞuCia1b>Z"6Uչ|>!1XQb=V@PT.σ|g|6[ލOe );')9@!|wiMoZc\ 7' 3ٯrP9_|KKk7|g|[vbK<)* յ²|96r|[PC('98)'>|6$kFCpK#.4J:7'3٩?YX.޻,~wrnnѓﲽأOGpmT@B[[ n1һgܾu2lFH'/ 1 ı<$Lv?FZBY|z0m>-3DD/.C  6[q6ƴݞ]Bs6[p7s GJhaU+[޻ >+H. < 1x >Ն4[1+ < ޻(#j:`>j[M+[6[KƶBFX[`5`d5H[.Gr|[޻gϾ55LU_ahgpzdbbfqmxܴ[B[YBl.K›[QM޻gإ>[6[q6ƴݞ]Bs6[p7s @JhZ\|f' 7' 3 7 N @J!!@1g{6[-STa );')9ϰ!1껲>@b<)* յ²S-[6{}mC('98)'>޻jQ>[ [ Xb £~tb^;H^=;|tv(wkr_r^q[Cj3*ȊȂNL,xO;4؃ZiopouvvqH,4ԥtB|[K11E[!g֨_#Y_;ei|g޻x>&[Ȱ6ڲձձ=%"9͎ǧshZRqG+SrR]otjq|{}m+twikBkAXWip{{sutqxvtusokprfp}¸γr\iH=,4I/fao.Rf5b Qvѻ_]Y1_9[QEQ[Q* [ OOO8-_лY['W*Wջ]#d1wrsskSF~|;[F Poo<wzmUޚ=ƻ`fvbmg}:v]hezuz[cdW_oq=vmxzzWG[ÞƴimɾroY,ivF>az|%~mqa[tfo5tm~j__jm66ku}74~uj57oeaae}uo5tTFFTSIIT~w`~~~w#`!2~~2~ P_4_4tPP_4_4t ))P_4_4t )@Rto_4_4oP޻,w6&[ ܾϐ{ܞErmT@B[[&޻,vw>9˓訸}[ ErmT@B[[9{VUVAw=IAXA[dAwAXA[d[IIQr0ceecpaap=7þAl]r Z*[]5|yص项@@=Y׽?WW?[>~i7 2A~~#2A~~2A~~w#`2A~~2A~ Rto_4_4oPTPto_4_4oP|pdsgppgsd\dsgppgsd$dsgppgsd|D w59``?VKJIKV?fXXdf``c-?VKJIKV?fXXdf``c€?VKJIKV?fXXdf``cI'Fx'F1=1׾ksXRzcef"eǺ̽XM5w(c2D˵3kkkkvihvC+wC-Cwi4-Cx++2A}"`_hrgegxq`qphYbaOx|w|zxΤ  cw--Ia͇c\[vOO[qw`jxnt`spyj((jxntspyj^jxntspyjcng]]ge_]ghqvvqqvur+FХz{ytxvl}u_C+4-CC-C+vw$|zltwQohcecvpr++rx2{U[Qѻe[Vf`[Q+#HB\-oHJ[HE[iش<1hg}~lh{kwmxIe_cYkb_]t{jqokwM6bf)&$2][},P[M%[Z}[m$yw$GTs"n^<;Q"mqt^jCmhd:0&-&(Uc5v}:&-eCo[ѻe:S)!FB\-oHJ[HE[lC#qH 9:BF_P@@PZC>ZƼqi]XgiXXgS=b|:mV\mbg)me "LbalxoEW`|za`ǘWZeonh[/VCLƮ[]s{PS]^oҠ޾͹Ϥ9K޻>[+H[.G+rr|[;]+0[+H[.G+|yvw`Wj zoW>@J!yzz`P`h>lsrr 7'0Fhh?x XF|:&N\ıѤ+Y|iЯ`Wxob^4l׊e "OZgVw~eF"c1v1H@tߠѢ+7|j׻6lh{ "n٦B 0re&q>[;[W~_0I 'D/sIU_iwh T`(['ҾbX fv"g޻>𥳴ȰP6Ѳ> \9* Zl Gs[f5:\cNfyM(gw:b`9^E^9\\711b Qv|;gYbذ1^{19vrrvvrrvQ>>QvrwCXXR)<<))<<*>MM>>MM?16[-aFa ) B Y"]vw|WfK (2`.>}az{ytxvl}u_Ӎխô V W\ U V W\ UX V W\ UXc V W\m U V\cVW\U^X+ħZw;ް@P9_|KKk7@@\oVc\ 7'5 @]z{ytxvl}u_@ҏҮźVW\UVmWm\mUXVW\UXc V W \m Uw V \cvw1X+ħwwt!̺dPPPz{ytxvl}u_Ѝ -C6ظ`}lqhn`PPcPr{ye``$I%H1TՅۇ2q38%G\kkjrqrwvw׽yjf |[f1[{1f[YR][>hq϶ͻsUVjLLLLjʾ I f[rI fr[f>[I01As+(jLLLLjjU|{!ڻJ+[{{sutqxvyusokprUYn~¸γr\iH=,4I/rts1[rqo[yDlDYXio$/(jLLLLjjkjLLLLkvwI`I;;j jj;ՌՌՌՌՌՌՌՌՌՌՌՌUTAA*AA*AA?AA*AA*AAvAA*AA*AAtAA*AA*AAuAA*AA*AA?AA*AA*AA?AA*AA*AA?AA*AA*AAf?[GfG[,FfFjxotspxk6 = +[6[q6+[6[q6oA|pw**7n7,ivkkkkvh\ivkkkkvhvKw`wW*LLLLjvMw>;jj j;;1޻ (Yg/ <7{[N: `af~[8+ < 8[ [߻ vWwLj;:; j;jj vw)^jjLLLLjUvwvIw; javgVE#vm_ے~%[f7[w/cm]I|5ݔvus 4}&:=sq8|||||puzzu|st|wDXwcmc+ħtv(wk°rPPPz{ytxvl}u_ЎُH,4ԥ`tB``_r^q[Cj3*ȊPȂNL,xO;4؃ZPopouvvмtI`j ;yƝ.:ߒCy  endstream endobj 94 0 obj << /Type /FontDescriptor /Ascent 748 /CapHeight 718 /Descent -238 /Flags 34 /FontBBox [ -201 -250 1279 961 ] /FontName /StoneSerif /ItalicAngle 0 /StemV 0 /XHeight 508 /FontFile3 95 0 R >> endobj 95 0 obj << /Length 17269 /Subtype /Type1C >> stream  StoneSerif8  ]U yCVy Copyright (c) 1987 Adobe Systems Incorporated. All rights reserved.Stone is a trademark of Adobe Systems Incorporated.Stone SerifStoneSerif`)sL!H]~"\P7v O , _ ; ;|U6&i/ mAU\%Wk" 1M $ f !!h!"A"##$$%i%%&e&&'q'(())*%*J*y*+"++,-7-]---. .5.U..//V///0i01J12r23r344u555667578T88999:+:;;<<=Q=>>>>>>>>>>?? ???%?.?7?A?K?U?_?i?s?{????????????????@@ @@@%@.@6@?@G@O@X@`@i@r@z@@@@@w EH8X =b{bb{yb=[$ immiimmic7ЋwRRT*" ]]Sr`t>` ]]Sr`tv&(&+hPmhhPmh Qw&Qkvvlvv`w&&Fߥ|ҶgDԀJ[[mƮESb]Rf\[|g(09J:nMDDq x*#/5"͇TK_g`B`߄X(XDWWPO\M&w=bTىڍTbaS|O=/&"Cٽɻahof e,[݇ 9΋w:%P9 %n|O]|]E6#uswO+y5I?24 24S~,*uswPb,~S244y%2?Iy5++wkPP : q>k7&[ͻ7r[vppwoIoppoopIJJ&o{O\|^D6#YY9ڿ immiimmiPswL(*'*=RGG=R*'*srBw\)iB=f|ptc@q>eޥHϳٲڱ.I*VA=[cn[҇ty?~t̉ ҉-$pɊ7 ]=zn_>|٧[:(LP F?w;PQ);]2,I>eho"Լߨq_?a}|X ;++"مȏǓ́F'E.VgD/vbܨ}qONs.L )9yD^9.`&VbNw$S|_jLq}`{ui%G]S8q `3j{nzpqJ_x qҫq]Hvs0e(GjR?ku` (`T18yKq倇.V.1aq' 6!ڢ7-8"?F\bqҫqDwHq ]b%1dv΢hPiqMprL7ӟTA5Rq倇.V.1RīƫqOs0*ӜTA5Sq倇.V.1q1aΡgPjqMprL,o6sJߠB臆q.N=]_;I2?$e434;oZ]*`.M)aps.1q1V臆q倇.AA臆q倇.V.1q1xs臆q倇.V.1q1xFt臆q倇.]DtE_tytixv]ĥe拚|ڤx.1q1wkXh+(U#bbMqɃ_^`arrxlZ臆q倇.qpHr ]b%2df臆q倇.V.1v<HT8.1q1Rʦ6Qqd\Yvz{gi}\qu\i)osFq͆}g{zv/)I/L)IJqĪkgkvz{gj}[qIiN7T9Y3P"q2@g.Omd<3lV)/S,>*WLNqws0WQ@w-$ 9:q倇.V.1q1?n"|qknj^H  `-Pna?0oS&2Vo d)ZSQ1A~ګqfvs0ecI48lK倇.V.1q1M] hSY))ة &&>"{bA0cR`'D1dg*(VJBQUD>Bq$w  i!T'Eտ۱SE0TIp-p-ͬ.1q1^ g臆q倇.Iikq}g{zv4C/)e $v6IPql >UAa`alqϥlLrM-N.K-W,Q@d jsv6Pqb)+\]Nœpq܊mxM_"a"^ Ze] BwJOQqw[hB"9f~qt^.PYhrqZqZdoȶ)i0rF`}eqTVYыQ1;bqƫnNi rqrJ...1qݥDPj0ьu6hDq0da;(2 U  s4lCY}ץvswQsssUsq^V~XCql4 A)*JLL>**Y9΋w%:`Ps fT,%kmWǹtGz<SlMiW]lx:HqrX _iy]x|VɢQ4a ]Sm,BQͪٿmlyve;w?ęU$J5M:fa}{D1"o0I/KLlX`_{KPqzp/DM~rksT$[%Ʊ{{PhjVf( %2A=h2<;w4ZM_V]ٷɴz`J:Hq_{KOqzp g^k0E"9γmuy9{:]B>L# @$D]oHUq]| jqpklpqkq~EGw[ZU(6Cqʃ_^`_C9HHj_{KOqzp16q6)u!w0Zs_{KOqzp16q606\D>K166<>@K16q6en;NeYbtv3;HeYk]oHTq]16q6܋6\3LL16q6fs4CeY`]oHTq]16q6Z4 %A:&? 4R. /FD8h9TęW.1y&%`djPyA0S(LLlXc]oHTq]16qLghD4j}svgKq6 Y0N0D"9ΰYM_V]ضɴ|`TvGH#(n{z}~rsWU]oHUq]16qUg0(Ӓϴ>Zr!L俚y-BXTĩ[i]ck9=\7I{P`tJai_QQWьqcp,5prxwyyx";]vsqpI۲}wTݬHq]oHTq]1(_Y.3\oHUq]o8nlzwvnG I2uőqZn? Icq„Cnnvn.njV+ $ ɠ^qĄ*n> ^'IsT)n}qwc4 .Xdqt`qJV;Wqbq}^pu%f Ǽ9qz`j<(v0F qqzN<W{jotd|PvzcqƒCm /cإͥ>'9d'qYzb=YH/sw%pۂCОU̜֝$TuUE}iMxxiBDkLwҠvswsIsw7;ZwFx`>U@yaJz¡UљɞIDa]@NJp`w kvtl`qgfediHg_Wif||{|ɬ EH ?|c|z||c?`;% immiimmiJhQh}dja{F%%/A=htu~y;z~rksTjpseWv%ŏnsD/=no~crB]<_b2m\Uƽ.*ΓOhw}fboK"{|"!^~=\JD}2TjkfvPw] WPOXP+۳PqnNl |}r{qoM  c4;4c4Wj}svgbqag>>>0bϵy1-gi&lp}ZtsDuN-aE%I|xrg{se gQ(~aЀN)idoscf\hnNQWhg]ot8d4.5a7IcX)G[5Je[Xu_Vk{U}N}UMUѿIP*lus}W#^fzST{i^SScUVSRyjbP_^Qgc|STTXa]9+)=9((9 7ЋwRP!" ]]Sr`t>9΋w%:%:h_s fT,%kmWǹt1 fT,%kmWǹt>aaaa 6)w&wyw+ 6)w&wywa 5)w'vywa 6)y{ttp-q(wTs$vaP|H#ԫyzt`um\Xj[\lU`KccMQie+NܔޱW‰ygwv}ezybNM{ex|za_bcxf|wvhWVQDXT58:NQ֫1Ȇyyhvv}fzxbѻ[Éъ´yhvv}fzxbNM{ex|za_bcxf|wvhWVTE[SSETcxf|wvhWVb_xaz|xe{R immiimmic=C= =*)==*)>R:%R %n|O]|]E6#>R:%:%R %n|O]|]E6#uj %n|O]|]E6#>9΋w:%:%T9 %n|O]|]E6#3j %n|O]|]E6#>aaaaM 6)x{tsp-q}+ 6)x{tsp-q; hnmiimnh  hnmiimnh  hnmiimnhvX(X׾XH[WPO\M&w=bTىڍTbͲDz^T=LD|d/ >lvvklvvk+; rrqrptto] rrqrpttoƲ β ;fmllonklm4^UU]\VU^k۱W(}tnt~h{oz}lͩbagQB%{uuzzy b%{uuzzy %Ͻ{Gyymyssz_jqtjlfowwqh;;f;c||c|Mߋq[ګkq_Euyl6Hq ]b%1dt΢hPjrMpqL7@ӞSA6jqȆekVkypypqJ_q!j}svgb˲d`|Z?otmkmWDr?ogyS^iyx}?lxho|śqpHr ]b%2duGB臆q倇.v Bb>.1"WG2LNұаܱx,>α簭9d<3l,3M3&n\oq2@geFhbhѫtDD.i}rvhf3=|&+{䌮gvr}i ҟTA5IC#:2jT"4BHqc ^b&2duΥhPjqMmqL7c˲KI"J.J?7%WLh紲ɪY@=oPR@Ad]Tv:S6ʳü_K_o}u,LMiW]l_1|zsksS#h ֧C?Vobft\@_iy]x|VɢQ4a ]Sm,HBQͪ6w0Z]oHTq]16q60!w0Zs_{KOqzps";j16q6v7K0ZkPKeUN:&\bvuwΡ@jWPOXPti|xr_CO@UZuagGʓl_H=AX]momomliJ\?Qvbu{}qZw|YsoIonnoonIowE].1q1qW;臆q倇.Re(HmQ?v vw)PWPOXP8WG:)m\vMdv|~r^wbku˸KkﳱQ*P?Qvbu{}qZw|Ysrp I O` hnmiimnh  hnmiimnhҠvswI'IcTOOMA][[^^[[]J==IH>=JhN/w@ŘW.1y&%`dj .]oHTq]16qLgyA=S,gev@` vYHwwС*Qy08WG:)m\vMdv|~r^wbku˸KkﳱQ0;0WPOXP:Rh_Zlqzj{[|ߊ㶊ۊNC ʘχP>jZym\pZQbh=c@ti|xr_CO@UZuagGʓl_H=AX]momomli]1DJ <PB7[[B7P_37[[37_> #;:$?0.#;;/#/C}xx}wt}?twњTוxmoU=RJRsUE`}SppIZswֳ F&'L/. ^+@rj{vG9Op1& /D"R%)z7һgDD<>:>>>>>><[>=:=[\cZw\w*QQh_Zlqzj{[|ߊ㶊܊NCVʘχP>jZym\pZPbh=]+PB7[[B7P_37[[37_> #;:$?0.#;;/#/&nycmnBF@䌹լcc{npR4? 7)D :\V \W\\:\UD\^\X8`_\V\W\\\Ux\Vx\\Wxe\\x\Uo;\X|\VN\WW\\|\UD\X>^j\^<\W^E\\^j\U(\V\\\cGڋVGWG\GڋUG^GX/׋_9ӋV9W9\9ӋUvVHWQ\vUX VՋWދ\ ŰX>yc Vߋ W \ Uv Vv̋ \ cPhD/ endstream endobj 96 0 obj << /Type /FontDescriptor /Ascent 748 /CapHeight 718 /Descent -238 /Flags 98 /FontBBox [ -210 -256 1299 949 ] /FontName /StoneSerif-Italic /ItalicAngle -12 /StemV 0 /XHeight 519 /FontFile3 97 0 R >> endobj 97 0 obj << /Length 17683 /Subtype /Type1C >> stream StoneSerif-Italic;   fI DxCopyright (c) 1987 Adobe Systems Incorporated. All Rights Reserved.Stone is a trademark of Adobe Systems Incorporated.Stone Serif ItalicStoneSerifStoneSerif-Italic[*d;p 6NntXJ'j  R 3 i ^  Y.%uD3T@'DyQ M  r2h-\9 ! !O!!""e"##s$"$?$%^&%&&'#''(()7)O)*h*+ +2+b+,,,-.*.Q.|...//C//00f000112[233445;56M6774789'9::m;";p;;^>q>??@-@7@A@K@U@_@i@r@z@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@AAAA&A0A9AAAIAQAYAaAiApAwA~AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBBB$ <w\EH4W ?b`a|{}oao@pc {e_mn_tns7Ћw33T" ]]Srx`ti` ]]Srx`tv%(%+iPAiiP?i ~QY%~QL?(a`zSEP$zq ,! >ݒ>ҳARBX\)iġ2=f|pt>eMAɸةѳB6<QY_^QUZ4IhQhyZHǿGH=9lBNn޶ QX#$8]Sb_qTˈliL~B5P h D$^9znY{>|ٸڰڶٹ1F?P(%/:"0ng}quEڑg#P)5v%3C8iWb$<pƛͅ'Kc`Y9!6_@<[̬T M  C[ObGrQ=9- (!NBTt;ZܡFaCFF[v G &A2;ֻX4P73UW$|د6L V ui{h]jp^P ui{h]jp^ L&y|E]{^E#$7 ui{h]jp^v=Z=Z~U~IIvL~~L=Z6IZᘬн UhD}v\KvŕOi1dcUS5/y_{3uf {e_mn_tnp. D>2,;>̙"Լߧq>ɲ$%"مǕ́(EVhe0v䨨ʧ+E1(<x)C^5r+vF(V^Fwc,cScwȬbyrZq{TBOy,L0_lwhTTn٬qW=W8 MC ,%($L4עQqۂ{?*{<8qd1VZ:V?=*yM,CL-'W梨#t~ATQP(OC,XX\kJ=jT ({mN?wWR[[BBq{h29V$"P$q!}A \Kq݂{?(z<9q;,XX\kJ=gL WyޤLwq۽cT ({mN?wWR[[Bl{ʩqklz<9q;qigjn]:5ӚR!q݂{?4G[>sososNUk,5sq^1V{ZBqkU4 A )*JMM**Y:͋w-_`s \N^zOɻ$P'Q[^< l \z|}<\tiz\"!\\Ȯ۴i1#1Ew@UFjs/34uuy-qo{ 2W5puK" !bt'84=wajk\{r^C)M{8&gZRk_?v 7lo#QwQ/^f.!\]Ȯ۵i0qo{mQ[^< l \z|};\thz `a{ gZSk_3t9csU8&D8A쬱UԙxoPeDN^vY%'lp|[taDuiV-a#W,Ѽ@u$VpVIoO]K@fPGGɠ!={kQTTxss(*#IaƌmkTjfw{Cp%V+8t;Şdz!Tʫ۾R`Mc)IdZxvvWJwjm 4{S_K\z|};]t}*tY-.TPLuuo{)vwy3 ;szHÁ\z|};]t}H񐢎wHE$0+ |dbtjkjjw1 ZΨ߶S/wIExsz: ojKhWP |dbtjkjjvw^wbP]uo{ RWosj\+.Cgg%.@Jw5)vUwsLuutw\z|};\t}bvvW\|z,]h)]hG\z|};\t}:xU8/X-/1YFwHExszvvWdm 4{S_K\z|};\t}4tX..TFxIExszjXS~n;X-$AVʇ#BNPv<׶m~}{zts>=F.8ڇsMݳHQ\ FwHExsz4&i _]gL=\EH_[XrTlhRLTUsuy^eYg¿H^_N)w0tЏ'0mwtpuqw'2a<J~\VDŽr\}nmo 6Kwww2z=b!Uq{(鐢wHExszLrv$)x2\z|}<\t}vw1O矧ʃsxzOy_dS#_jy2SudDvw%NjVզ˃twzOyYmYS]"*ay{{Vn[q`-6nyVvBeSvZƖwzzd4P7xs~}}Vzxlz~zSyypj]Sc1z^sM+8,mi`wrvw1&ʃsxzOy^cT%^ly2SudDgaqghdkhinsۋBz\ kwsQw sI{XpK)Nswxfok NIیG՞سU֦М$OupcU}EviHxxi|BvswsINsw0xg ]{@fIz;ZwAxv`{>cU|@paFzǡUѠΞMNJp`y kwslaqgeediHg_Wjf||{|ɬ<F]PH _ARc_{cAP {e_mn_tn9[~{ 8ByƯh[Sk`|~C}}wvdpNi]|_rC)M{HCjd=}vx@x9>xÉl~~crD]8`l2m[~SǾK+*ΡOhlj~kkp;4#f^!^@ELyvPwf*]PO]P-ڴQqnN_9~G|qoMb-wP5c5~Tk}swf`qbh>>=.bεxm+i&lq}ZusCuN,aE$I|yrf{see)ͯӫҮwCyJi=$Z$ccV8-P bN%HRueduhN}q_ބjb(vğs}XpdnserN]m\`hrrr#^fzST{i_SSbUVSRyjbQ^^Qgc|STTXa\9+)=9((97Ћw93P" ]]Srx`t:͋w-_k-_hs \N^zOɻ% \N^zOɻ63 )vQ{uw{+ )vQ|uw )vQ{uw )|ztmp%ph^w^ wHix]ZG!ڙ[p|>mW2wB-a"W,ѻXdzK\z|};\t}{vjv]%'͸yj\z|};\t}6lZvaDuiV-a#W,Ѽ(ccM,VwҒܥd˜җݙes|]kf9Ða`sLlc{-;y\y`;tQzDMT58z:dNVwВlc{-;z\x`;t~TzDQTS~ET8~[~Z1spTAyʪxۜfۢh_he:œg˜Җݙes{^jf9Ða`sL S ui{h]jp^=Q_-Q {M[|^E"$Q_-k_-Q {M[|^E"$Yk {M[|^E"$:͋w_-k_-T: {M[|^E"$%k {M[|^E"$62z )|ztmp%p+ )|ztmp%p ui{h]jp^ 2 ui{h]jp^  ui{h]jp^-^^^H]PO]P\MԪүm:bm\MԪүm:bm\c+E~ &88\+E~ &881+E~ &88MԪүm:bm7x4~k=SEY+P CJҙˏoNT|{synQŶԲ蝷P {e_mn_tna~w_[\syw{|tyz0a~w2+up{yw<66%/;L6;U`[< vojgf\dL_^Qq́]›SSKoTMFRYʊh&s8@YMlrvllv{j%%A ypqnrqqs] ypqnrqqsNƳ > enllpokmm3^UU]\VU^Nkٳwu(}tnr~g{q{vlөg`g~w988梛uq{yv<a8梛uq{yv<<%ɿwGyujyrt|dgqmjlfoww5%h;6;gc|cMqRٱqJ`{*= taJqyh$T\.2eڛt̓cclqz_l~xN7ҒY@7qoal alxgTqTdvµqcrWa˲ѬdW1. q^ԺxCo m~t{Djq ,tlGqv wxwJqs]/[[.2e֚x\Eڏ~ޖqۂ{?_rV_`nz<9,X _xC\9 tfhVQaT,.t\.;PFr?{OU)lZ]_ZVG+iBSPnuƱw`o}^{d(F&{EӒY@7\.&jJ?gc׆mJqzi$U[-1eڛt͒cclq{_l}yM8a˲9d8r4> ԚıʱD*Q[=«ճ۳۱հܴܱնܰ<FL.8xfsZ@]PO]PE99Zgapo}jtx^f7 ԗְWCeYzhZpoUYL,۹Jʞqh<AN[fnjqmqesitww^-³a;RRuadzG1;4!-PB7[[B7P_37[[37_> #;:$?0.#;;/#/UxwrwmVҳf.9weJ_^wAWÜlq_jL=`ppI>Q$MCutyrpD]nٽpglN 0<"8LuvhZt׼smrSM"UJ]tԉۿo!|yXZ]XYYYYZYZ]YYXY]]vlJwPO99Zgapo}jtx^f7dԗְWCeYzhZpoUYL,-PB7[[B7P_37[[37_> #;:$?0.#;;/#/2+9^2B;48 ț`^q]A )ŋpK;PVIPWRP\;PUSP^PXN_PVPWP\PUKPVKzPWKP\KPUFPXWPVGPWPP\WPUPXPcWPV3PW> endobj 99 0 obj << /Length 18063 /Subtype /Type1C >> stream StoneSerif-Semibold8  R'X FpxCopyright (c) 1987 Adobe Systems Incorporated. All rights reserved.Stone is a trademark of Adobe Systems Incorporated.Stone Serif SemiboldStoneSerifStoneSerif-Semibold^&*_4^s:u6k] + K { c +  HZEKsY7S}uGZ[CT)#  U ! !o!"C"|""#8##$Y%%1%&8'''((())*G*\*+,,,,-<-..^/://00'0p00011M1122-2B23w34^55V66_67578w889i: :;,;Z;<~<<=$=>>??@M@@AAAAAAAAAABB BBB$B-B7BABKBUB_BiBqB{BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBCC CCC%C-C6C>CFCOCWC`CiCqCyCCCC*w+*(HDc ,`l[~l`,$ gcchhcbid7ЋwIIT1" WWSr`td` WWSr`tj/2]Ho]]In]=y=ljjojj"czv wӨq%g)= e@ljrƭ Yf]Uk`Z|&7I/Rcklsir@ET~n(yƊ1rh!@h_So NSbdjY݄11D5PF6P\l[ZFFZ\ll[ZFFZ\l\$TS2$4"TS1"3Ie.VA O _kVe@)Qᷖʯ Siwd iEhb64jĩlEn[Oeٳ&HQtfpD00;cGXɯf58:\^Y`f`GXHڻ(*J:H(TGF[gsW؆ov6}o։(0pȊ% KE{n[8zߪ`;'KV ?1wTP7Z`2,NEjlw"ζߤw_ 7a}wX7(%"݃ȏǓ́F=\KdnE3ve騨vuU[m^)P@V(.p&VTPw$Ns _lTl`mwf O9J7pg@_ugznlW]} ŋӬ!H 2` (_R?Dy(-6 1 lyx|pdp|xyi^lx/ߴd+QgVF&/U:O4cD<F?(UH5/>oZ].`.=rԠY!,wDbwlyx|pdp|xyi^xIR 7">}lɰl!AwIp2axT9fwΠ^T}pRpdL8ѣVD5lyx|pdp|xyh_?l!Nܱ1yx|pdp|xyi^lϪ^idΠ^T}pRpdL,*ѤVD5I/dOчyx|qK&jk+#62KC"@/>oZ].`.=q룡Lnټ!!p|xyh_lϪ_hdlyx|pEElyx|pdp|xyh_lЪ^ht!lyx|pdp|xyi^lϪ^ivI!lyx|pDzj_muqgvrU}ÜϟW㋪̭!' p|xyi^lϪ^iuM]e)7)GOalm^^BEkltalyx|pl !pIo2bxT:fklyx|pdp|xyi^!PPWulfWEruxjq}UlxVpp|xyi^lϪ^iỴIiKlو}jxur7/T3}lDzi]Nruxjp}Ul>p$)H=i .\ /5/\K){D!$oX]%1,'> s)1-<TYZJ,E(3T[ 0^IBQVJ6Rzp,w#k%THտڰGL !+VLp-p-ʰp|xyi^lϪ^iI !lyx|pEu\~l}jxur3FFev1'PlW9 $^]^sl˨tBpS"T$R"V)V4_v`v18"Omj)'C?F³{l܆uzKc#c$cM=I2wϢʍ70,Vls`l 0&+ely^;5sBWlpZlZdrλT!`E`elTY^㋪!!_h9kmƯqMirlvK0,p|xyh_lfަhP0ʑe*`Dp0gc9((Us4OJyz̬bvswZsssUAU4j̝Vz^|LJj X')*K6L**Y.݋wP`_w bR-imTϼoQf9>.ϰٰѣaյQ#ոʵć}Ǵʰť9#*ѱ+7TѲǏmpX6!Ķ<=d;$g76w!57MWe[*^ 繮z^JfT{{_{K&ldpg^e' '9 !3ͺorp)o8V wIPH 69k<˗v|reoO%u. û\Mat~yv!]s(zu]pzmdxp~OrF\:F>Xp|xyihlͪOhbDGK|CPJe=2LѺ!NXRDlh` R!;[d&<|^m$]zv|I % ^;Lmb xuVDǏ<1_}AL>rˎы56wcs_{K&ldp~p|xyhhlmiؔEFSp|xyiolhhml9CeY`,w%&$Un4GlYp|xyhhlhi$( blm`bkkb,w%&d[\qdruurL$DVn4GlY blm_ckkbDBw s_{K&ldp~p|xyhhlhi0_F[ (.opec`\EA= Hw0s_{K&ldp~p|xyhhlhi0,uBؐK@Sp|xyhploi>ِK@Sp|xyiolhhml:Ie]dfpB:Ee]gUn4GlYp|xyhhloiы,ucؔEFSp|xyiolhhml9CeY`Un4GlYp|xyhhlniZ!!6 -5a=5( *}8;2KWTR6\$c6y!yE d%fhpJ{0':5CHiX`Vn4GlYp|xyihlªZhd<!5q|xyhZlªhiC.<5'8 !3ˬJYeX*_z]Q,wUn4GlYp|xyhhl^i 󜯧uDk|||ss|lt$aQRTvS䱚z~9=_T¨[aX]b)=\:PoNTtWeraSRẐprs,;elyhxmx@Xn-utq=nҍwUY{{(Un4GlY1`gI@0Un4HlYm(=rnwvi\w1|l_nA GjlKrvihioV ϣilƇ+h?u@D{oJ* #mlsd6 &^fmu`lRV*^kblbnj$V»Clv_fF7yvc\'#vlp^H(c6ydhyfzZwqll»~Kp 2ڦPpYye?Q-7sw"ۂCОU̜֝TuUE}iMxxiBDkLwvsws=swJ@w]LDԕ͞M}UTza@U>`xCwZ;K Bx`z ozuj\thfediHg_Ofg||{|ɬ°*+*(` |,vaxl~xva|,`-$ chhbchib8]y͐@"4>=dmx:Ŧ$uɱDZɏT{ikȰ–Աzٗ@¦cǿ<_z2m[{E$ Γ\cy}fmY8+u~5+^~<\JD}2h{kuvPwR{ 5PF6PUҸ~!xalĥtJs11w~lvJZ ^D8^8!p|xyg^lΪ_i88!6y"ci'll{ZbXDuN-X.2|+Lqxrazqb1eb+sc@aviŸgrufiappMR_mmd)3X03YRY`KaYu`]izX}}{wO|ƴKCu{|xyhêێia|xysi̋!_s'̵ı|xysi݂ibܒ|sdb=:>|wyhêێi\\?S\Nܙ޿Cˆq~fɲā|g97{|za_ld{w=<RDCT58:NPvŰxwIބqq~fwy|cqlgŽDˆq~fwy|cqlg97{ex|za_ffld{ywg}=<TDDTSETfld{ywg}=<e_qaz|xe{G*+ bihccgib=7ߵl WQɵ-FP03i}rvdhl=>hcC= =*)==*)>UPU -kyGZ|[A*+UPPU -kyGZ|[A*i -kyGZ|[A*=*݋wPPT* -kyGZ|[A*i -kyGZ|[A*ff!ffT 2'}{v ruq; vr, 2'}{v ruq; v* bihccgib  bihccgib  bihccgibu111D5PF6P\l[ZFFZ\ll[ZFFZ\l\$TS2$4"TS1"32"TS1"3l[ZFFZ\l*&+!JiPSVXER6L ΗȎs`_}}upo\p⓶P. gbdhhcbivTGcwpqtxzorx{-4vT'xtqptuw%'44'$;C$;+L`4K momdiwstumJcXI|~~~}˾ʑ+\GͲDz^T=LD|d/ Udnmdcnmb,< npoompqln npoompql͹:Zqooqrooq-¸^UU\\VU^Qkس}-(tiqq}oz}lͩbdcbTU-wwpssvu&'-vxossvu%'%Gwvp|ts}Uhprmjgnð;_$;$;]\||\|?lRհfl !Auxk4Ip2axT9fwΠ^T|pSpdL8ѣUE5lȆjmY}`rjynlW]up|xyh_dŷ].hmk{ohZ.nLvbyQXk¬{y{k-Uppgp}ʟZ~_޷l !pIo2bxT:fs#J/lyx|pH`?p|xyi^\ /5/Ca?9RB7l98_'7O61fWr\K){jN1+_TGNKLOcvw= g<qfɰr-!B.i}rrml {B 5jvr}i!ѤVD5vC#92jT!4BIpc2awT9fwΣ^T}pRodL8dŷ/Z"B-X*J2LkU ᬵ̙1V4laeLE_`Gh8>W m ¼\Mat~xL._\Q^tѣZ.yŌu|sdoP&}/̧I6SpffpYFV]xX}p~[ťQ9#[*hMl+H7TѲ,w0Un4GlYp|xyhhlhi0vws_{K&ldpn%Gepp|xyhhlhis?WZ!wgNN`QMa=5HP`NMfkxBsh,0kho`7?qSh}$fYhp8! V  û\Mat~y<8*3%XDKGCN$AI&Qd^h`CI^>5( )ܳfGxƌu|sdoP&|/x Z p|xyihlhh:2푧u9 q+olMbaQcod^lrviĈuvAwٷ(Fh:A40$#[Qrkd4\_Qrju{}q[sYrjj=>yvҍwU.kog렠VyԲtnwNY{{lUn4GlY1`gI@(Un4HlY:uI)P(™^VtaR{TJ"umpW]t]c!!vhYtWYY!,zp|xyi^lwDbwlyx|pIJR7"=}aqͿowܦ9i|n[,P1LUqbkJȖ{RGBJSZlpirwu]5PF6PT\_Qrju{}q[sYr+i=ijjiij=i@ !F!_(RK<lyx|pdp|xyi^lϪ^i!߳f+RjUHw$P82_W@p\oQiu|~rZsksN߶G#E5PF6P4\_Qrju{}q[sYr**o*j = C+ bihdbhib  bihdbhibvsw='=TEEM<`]]aa]]`|J==IH>=JcI*w&kA i%fhp +Vn4GlYup|xyihlªZh{0 :7fdr9f U8w~4E߶GE5PF6P! Ndfbkt~gw~Uy䵊܉Q3ڀחΈB;\_yjXt[Obm=cksN1_W@p\oQiu|~rZsd˿ɦ9i|n[,P1LUqbkJȖ{RGBJSZlpirwu]%.?A[77[[77[[78Z[77[887 88888E}xx}wtzStwњTޕ~pqUmwerfsKALm>>12T22423232U4222UTdU94!Odebkt~gw~Uy䵊܉Q3pחΈB;\_yjXt[Obl=%q&[77[[77[[78Z[77[887 88888faxkoWHFƪe`{npQ5B 7)D ;\V \W\\;\UW\^\X2_ \V\W\\ \Ut\Vt^\Wtg\\t\UI\X\i\V\;\W\D\\\i\U\(\X>\cI`\VI2\WI;\\I`\U1\V \\\cQߋVQWQ\QߋUQ^QX+_)ˋV)W)\)ˋUuVGWP\uUދXV̋WՋ\UXRoc V݋ W \ U V̋ \ cPhD/ endstream endobj 100 0 obj << /S /D >> endobj 101 0 obj << /Nums [ 0 100 0 R ] >> endobj 102 0 obj << /Dt (D:20031219165446) /JTM (Distiller) >> endobj 103 0 obj /This endobj 104 0 obj << /CP (Distiller) /Fi 103 0 R >> endobj 105 0 obj << /JTF 0 /MB [ 0 0 571 780 ] /W [ 0 26 ] >> endobj 106 0 obj << /Fi [ 104 0 R ] /P [ 105 0 R ] >> endobj 107 0 obj << /Dm [ 571 780 571 780 ] >> endobj 108 0 obj << /Me 107 0 R >> endobj 109 0 obj << /D [ 106 0 R ] /MS 108 0 R /Type /JobTicketContents >> endobj 110 0 obj << /A [ 102 0 R ] /Cn [ 109 0 R ] /V 1.10001 >> endobj 111 0 obj << /CreationDate (D:20031219165446) /Producer (Agfa Apogee Normalizer) /ModDate (D:20031219165449+08'00') >> endobj 112 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 113 0 obj << /Length 114 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R6 gs /F2 1 Tf 0 Tc 0 Tw 0 Tr 30 0 0 30 127 622.9541 Tm (7)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 18 0 0 18 127 598.9541 Tm [(Be Careful What Y)91.7(ou W)29.6(ish For:)-287(The)]TJ 1.1111 TL T*(European Union and North America)Tj /F3 1 Tf 10.5 0 0 10.5 127 557.9541 Tm [(Edwar)7.7(d A. Fogar)-9.9(ty)]TJ /F4 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 10 0 0 10 127 488.9541 Tm [(1)-1197.4(Introduction)]TJ 0 Tc 6.5 0 0 6.5 209.1217 492.4542 Tm (1)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.1348 Tw 9 0 0 9 127 468.4541 Tm (Since the early 1990s, the United States and the European Union have)Tj 0.1241 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(taken halting steps toward institutionalizing cooperative economic and)Tj 0.0045 Tc -0.0047 Tw T*(trade relations in a bilateral framework. EU and U.S. negotiators have c\ ome)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.3985 Tw T*(up with several potential frameworks \320 including the Transatlantic)Tj 0.12241 Tw T*(Partnership \(TAP\), the Transatlantic Business Dialogue \(TABD\), and t\ he)Tj 0.10471 Tw T*(New Transatlantic Agenda \(NTA\) \320 in which to cement commercial ties\ )Tj 0.2345 Tw T*(between these two economic giants. Each has hailed the vitality and)Tj 0.0007 Tc -0.00079 Tw T*(importance of transatlantic economic relations; yet, each has failed to \ build)Tj 0.0011 Tc -0.0013 Tw T*(momentum toward a larger goal of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area \(TAFTA\ \).)Tj 0.0051 Tc -0.0052 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (While the United States and European Union were launching these serial)Tj 0.0134 Tc -0.0135 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (trial balloons of institutionalized commercial ties, Washington was simu\ l-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.16541 Tw T*(taneously busy establishing the North American Free Trade Agreement)Tj 0.08569 Tw T*(\(NAFTA\), which, by promoting unfettered commerce among the United)Tj 0.0106 Tc -0.0107 Tw T*(States, Mexico, and Canada, created a new North American economic bloc)Tj 0.01131 Tc -0.0114 Tw T*(that would potentially rival the EU in world markets. While not as insti\ tu-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0603 Tw T*(tionally ambitious as the EU, NAFTA became a cornerstone of U.S. trade)Tj 0.0004 Tc -0.0005 Tw T*(policy as a gateway to a prospective Free Trade Area of the Americas \(F\ TAA\),)Tj 0.0022 Tc -0.0023 Tw T*(and a key piece of the evolving patchwork of international economic inte\ g-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0854 Tw T*(ration. Thus the establishment of NAFTA \320 and the prospect of a futur\ e)Tj 0.2041 Tw T*(FTAA \320 promised to embed EU\320U.S. trade relations in an increasingl\ y)Tj 0.00639 Tc -0.0065 Tw T*(complex web of current and future relationships, involving some countrie\ s)Tj 0.01421 Tc -0.0143 Tw T*(directly \(Mexico and Canada\) and others indirectly \(potential members\ of)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(NAFTA, FTAA, and the EU\).)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0596 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (What is relevant in the context of this book is that there has failed to\ )Tj 0.0034 Tc -0.00349 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (emerge from this hodgepodge any real momentum toward \320 or indeed, any\ )Tj 0.00751 Tc -0.0076 Tw T*(hint of \320 transatlantic interregionalism. Simply put, there is no dis\ cernable)Tj 0.0027 Tc -0.00279 Tw T*(EU\320\322North America\323 relationship, at least not in the terms in w\ hich corres-)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0166 Tw T*(ponding interregional relationships have been discussed by other authors\ )Tj 0.00861 Tc -0.0087 Tw T*(in this volume. But this state of affairs is perhaps what makes this neg\ ative)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 279.0664 126.1211 Tm (180)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 0 0 1 k /R6 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 180)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 0 0 1 K 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 0 0 1 K 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 114 0 obj 5687 endobj 115 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 116 0 obj << /Length 117 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R20 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.00529 Tc -0.0054 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (case important to explore \320 it is just as essential to account for wh\ y interre-)Tj 0.01151 Tc -0.0116 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(gionalism does not occur as it is to understand why it does. The EU\320N\ orth)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.21671 Tw T*(America case is a particularly good negative case \(as opposed to, say,)Tj 0.2912 Tw T*(EU\320Central Asian relations\) because all of the factors highlighted i\ n)Tj 0.0081 Tc -0.00819 Tw T*(Aggarwal and Fogarty\325s introduction to this volume \320 interest grou\ p activi-)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0172 Tw T*(ties, bureaucratic contention, balance of power politics, and identity c\ on-)Tj 0.01151 Tw T*(cerns \320 are all conspicuously present in this relationship. Nowhere i\ s this)Tj 0.0163 Tc -0.0164 Tw T*(statement more true than with respect to the EU\320U.S. relationship, wh\ ich)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(forms the core of this case and shadows each of the others. )Tj 0.01311 Tc -0.0132 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (This chapter does not seek to make a general evaluation of EU\320U.S. re\ la-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1049 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (tions \320 which are exceedingly multifaceted and evolving too quickly t\ o)Tj 0.00169 Tc -0.0018 Tw T*(make lasting assessments of anyway \320 but rather forces it through the\ given)Tj 0.0061 Tc -0.0062 Tw T*(lens and focuses only on the prospects for an interregional regime betwe\ en)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0226 Tw T*(the EU and North America as a whole. It is a story of disappointment for\ )Tj 0.0726 Tw T*(those Altanticists who have waited expectantly for the arrival of a more\ )Tj 0.0123 Tw T*(formal transatlantic partnership, but, as will be suggested below, perha\ ps)Tj 0.01781 Tw T*(one from which a happy ending is more likely to emerge for the interna-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(tional political economy as a whole.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw 10 0 0 10 126.1811 417.3862 Tm [(2)-1197.3(EU commercial relations with North America)]TJ /F2 1 Tf 0.01691 Tc -0.017 Tw 9 0 0 9 126.1811 396.8862 Tm (Despite the creation of NAFTA in 1994, the EU has studiously maintained)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.11549 Tw T*(separate bilateral tracks for managing its commercial relations with the\ )Tj 0.1489 Tw T*(three countries of North America. Thus to assess the EU\325s trade ties \ to)Tj 0.2634 Tw T*(NAFTA as a whole, we \336rst have to consider those with each North)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(American country individually. )Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.006 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(Europe and the United States)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.04581 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(The evolution of European\320American economic ties since the end of the\ )Tj 0.0027 Tc -0.00279 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(Cold War are best understood in the context of a much longer-term histor\ y)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.12041 Tw T*(of integration \(and disintegration\). U.S.\320European commercial relat\ ions)Tj 0.0072 Tc -0.00729 Tw T*(over the last 150 years have been a consistent story \320 with one big b\ lip \320 of)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1398 Tw T*(ever closer union. Trade between the two sides of the Atlantic steadily)Tj 0.0495 Tw T*(increased between the latter half of the nineteenth century and the out-\ )Tj 0.00681 Tc -0.0069 Tw T*(break of war in Europe in 1914, with the United States entering the war \ for)Tj 0.00751 Tc -0.0076 Tw T*(the most part because Germany\325s unrestricted naval warfare wreaked in\ tol-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.04691 Tw T*(erable havoc on U.S. trade with the belligerents. Growth in transatlanti\ c)Tj 0.00549 Tc -0.0056 Tw T*(trade resumed through the end of the 1920s; the Great Depression that fo\ l-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1001 Tw T*(lowed was exacerbated by policies that sharply curtailed this trade. The\ )Tj 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw T*(postwar cooperation between Western Europe and the United States in cre-\ )Tj 0.0081 Tc -0.00819 Tw T*(ating the liberal international economic order, with its provisions for \ facil-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1772 Tw T*(itating stable and open trade relations between the two, was largely a)Tj 0.00169 Tc -0.0018 Tw T*(legacy of shared dissatisfaction with the beggar-thy-neighbor policies o\ f the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.00819 Tw T*(1930s \320 and was not simply a reaction to the threat of the Soviet Uni\ on.)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 440.8233 147.0363 Tm (2)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 358.5346 663.1211 Tm (Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8.9724 0 Td (181)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R20 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 181)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 117 0 obj 6665 endobj 118 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 119 0 obj << /Length 120 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R4 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.0051 Tc -0.0052 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (The two sides\325 commitment to the General Agreement on Trade and Tarif\ fs)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0238 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(\(GATT\) \320 which was formally multilateral but whose direction was de\ ter-)Tj 0.0197 Tw T*(mined in large part by U.S.\320European collaboration \320 helped to lib\ eralize)Tj 0.0097 Tc -0.0098 Tw T*(transatlantic trade relations, to the effect that by the 1970s earlier l\ evels of)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.15199 Tw T*(integration had been reached once again. Agreements in the Kennedy,)Tj 0.0867 Tw T*(Tokyo, and ultimately the Uruguay Rounds of multilateral trade negoti-)Tj 0.0206 Tw T*(ations formalized this creeping process of cooperation and liberalizatio\ n.)Tj 0.00191 Tc -0.002 Tw T*(The point of this dash through the history of transatlantic commercial r\ ela-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1667 Tw T*(tions is simply to show that, generally speaking, both Europe and the)Tj -0.0074 Tw T*(United States have prospered when transatlantic commerce has bloomed,)Tj 0.0117 Tc -0.0118 Tw T*(and both have paid a heavy price \320 and indeed the international econo\ my)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(as a whole has paid a heavy price \320 when it wilted.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1257 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The Europe\320United States commercial relationship remains today the)Tj 0.0985 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (cornerstone of the world economy. The EU and United States represent )Tj 0.00211 Tc -0.0022 Tw T*(the world\325s two largest markets, and each absorbs roughly 20 percent \ of the)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0112 Tw T*(other\325s exports, with total trade in 1998 worth roughly $400 billion.\ )Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 422.9039 469.0363 Tm (3)Tj 0.01711 Tc 9 0 0 9 428.9981 465.8862 Tm (The)Tj 0.1969 Tw -33.5352 -1.2778 Td (relationship is similarly intimate with respect to investment: in 1999,)Tj 0.03391 Tw T*(European \336rms accounted for over 60 percent of FDI stock in the Unite\ d)Tj 0.00259 Tc -0.0027 Tw T*(States \(roughly $600 billion in total\), while American \336rms owned a\ similar)Tj 0.00751 Tc -0.0076 Tw T*(proportion of investment stock \(approximately $500 billion in total\) i\ n EU)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.02341 Tw T*(member countries.)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 208.6734 411.5363 Tm (4)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.02341 Tw 9 0 0 9 215.0798 408.3862 Tm (The total amount of trade and investment streaming)Tj -0.00279 Tw -9.7665 -1.2778 Td (across the Atlantic comes to $36 billion )Tj /F3 1 Tf 19.3803 0 Td (per day)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0 Tc 0 Tw 3.2528 0 Td (.)Tj 5.85 0 0 5.85 333.6153 400.0363 Tm (5)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.00279 Tw 9 0 0 9 339.7857 396.8862 Tm (The current level of eco-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw -23.6227 -1.2778 Td (nomic integration is high, and is only getting higher.)Tj 0.0103 Tc -0.01041 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Assessments of troubles in EU\320U.S. commercial ties tend to suffer fro\ m a)Tj 0.007 Tc -0.0071 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (lack of a sense of proportion. Economic relations remain, despite headli\ ne-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.006 Tw T*(grabbing disputes about bananas or steel, almost completely trouble-free\ .)Tj 0.0136 Tc -0.0137 Tw T*(As EU trade commissioner Pascal Lamy has asserted, less than 2 percent o\ f)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1774 Tw T*(total EU\320U.S. trade is involved in some sort of dispute.)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 378.727 331.0363 Tm (6)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1774 Tw 9 0 0 9 386.5193 327.8862 Tm (Much of this)Tj 0.00571 Tc -0.0058 Tw -28.8154 -1.2778 Td (exchange is intra\336rm, which underscores the fact that transatlantic \322\ trade\323)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.15649 Tw T*(is very much intertwined with investment and merger and acquisition)Tj 0.2144 Tw T*(activities. Given the extensiveness of mutual interests, both with one)Tj 0.00861 Tw T*(another and with respect to the global economy, the two have retained a)Tj 0.0031 Tc -0.0033 Tw T*(broadly consonant preference for, and agenda in, multilateral liberaliza\ tion)Tj 0.00681 Tc -0.0069 Tw T*(of trade and investment through the WTO \320 despite each\325s participa\ tion in)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(various regional and trans-/interregional arrangements. )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.00861 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (In the past as now, however, growing integration and interdependence)Tj 0.19859 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (have not been synonymous with unproblematic commercial relations.)Tj 0.00391 Tc -0.004 Tw T*(During the 1940s and 1950s the United States overtly sought to undermine\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1783 Tw T*(the systems of imperial preference Britain and France had constructed)Tj 0.03909 Tw T*(among their respective colonies. During the 1960s the United States and)Tj 0.1503 Tw T*(Europe fought the \322chicken wars,\323 and Europe chafed under American\ )Tj 0.2818 Tw T*(benign neglect of its role as international creditor and its export of)Tj 0.01511 Tc -0.0152 Tw T*(in\337ation from the Vietnam War and Great Society programs. In the 1970\ s)Tj 0.0041 Tc -0.0042 Tw T*(the two were buffeted by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and th\ e)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (182)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R4 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 182)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 120 0 obj 7347 endobj 121 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 122 0 obj << /Length 123 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R1 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.0392 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (oil shocks, and the United States put increasing pressure on Europe \(an\ d)Tj 0.0377 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(particularly West Germany\) to act as an engine of world growth. Among)Tj 0.0498 Tw T*(the problems during the 1980s were the pasta and citrus wars, as well as\ )Tj 0.0641 Tw T*(European progress toward a single market that made Americans nervous)Tj 0.0121 Tc -0.01221 Tw T*(about a new \322fortress Europe.\323 Over the past decade, bananas, gene\ tically-)Tj 0.0051 Tc -0.0052 Tw T*(modi\336ed organisms, steel, and the tax status of U.S. multinational co\ rpora-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.28259 Tw T*(tions have all tested the bilateral relationship \(as well as the fragil\ e)Tj 0.03011 Tw T*(enforcement mechanisms of the WTO\), and tensions in the aftermath of)Tj 0.0139 Tc -0.01401 Tw T*(the 2003 Iraq war at least temporarily injected nationalist sentiments i\ nto)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0385 Tw T*(consumer choices on both sides of the Atlantic. But U.S.\320European tra\ de)Tj -0.0108 Tw T*(relations have always involved complex patterns of economic intercourse)Tj 0.13969 Tw T*(as well as political cooperation and contention, and these more recent)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(developments should be seen in this light.)Tj 0.0103 Tc -0.01041 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (During the 1990s, in the wake of the cold war and in a period of ascend-\ )Tj 0.0054 Tc -0.00549 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (ant regionalism, the United States and Europe struggled to recast their \ rela-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1712 Tw T*(tions in the absence of the Soviet threat. Many analysts predicted the)Tj 0.01711 Tw T*(future of international competition to be economic rather than political\ -)Tj 0.009 Tc -0.00909 Tw T*(security, and policymakers in the United States and Europe sought ways t\ o)Tj 0.01489 Tc -0.015 Tw T*(retain their partnership even in the face of a growing sentiment that th\ eir)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1212 Tw T*(relationship would be increasingly de\336ned by commercial competition.)Tj 0.0995 Tw T*(Accordingly, the United States and Europe announced a series of agree-)Tj 0.07739 Tw T*(ments during the 1990s that attempted to institutionalize economic co-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(operation, with varying degrees of signi\336cance and success.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0311 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (In 1990, the two sides announced a Transatlantic Declaration that was)Tj 0.088 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (intended to deepen and institutionalize commercial relations. However,)Tj 0.009 Tw T*(this declaration was more symbolic than substantive. Its main functional\ )Tj 0.0031 Tc -0.0032 Tw T*(purpose was to establish a framework for regular consultation, speci\336\ cally a)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.05051 Tw T*(regimen of biannual summits at which U.S. and European ministers and)Tj 0.0161 Tc -0.0162 Tw T*(heads of state would meet to discuss important issues on the transatlant\ ic)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(and world agendas.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0576 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (A New Transatlantic Agenda \(NTA\) was unveiled in December 1995 to)Tj 0.04289 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (provide some of the substance that the Transatlantic Declaration lacked.\ )Tj 0.1306 Tw T*(The NTA sought to broaden the scope of EU\320U.S. cooperation both on)Tj 0.00751 Tc -0.0076 Tw T*(trade and investment matters as well as on transnational issues such as \ ter-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.07359 Tw T*(rorism and the environment. On the economic front, the NTA spawned)Tj 0.00101 Tw T*(two further acronyms: the New Transatlantic Marketplace \(NTM\) and the)Tj 0.013 Tc -0.01311 Tw T*(Transatlantic Business Dialogue \(TABD\). The NTM, for its part, was to \ be a)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.00929 Tw T*(framework for dismantling most remaining trade and investment barriers)Tj 0.00841 Tc -0.0085 Tw T*(between the two, and a building block toward a possible Transatlantic Fr\ ee)Tj 0.0107 Tc -0.01089 Tw T*(Trade Area. However, the NTM\325s broad agenda proved dif\336cult to tra\ nslate)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.02049 Tw T*(into speci\336c commitments, and the NTM ultimately gave way to a some-)Tj 0.0045 Tc -0.00459 Tw T*(what less ambitious Transatlantic Economic Partnership \(TEP\) in 1998. \ The)Tj 0.00751 Tc -0.0076 Tw T*(TEP focused on the less sexy but still quite important matters of harmon\ iz-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(ing standards and cooperating on other nontariff barriers more generally\ .)Tj /F3 1 Tf 8 0 0 8 358.5346 663.1211 Tm (Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8.9724 0 Td (183)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R1 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 183)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 123 0 obj 6729 endobj 124 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 125 0 obj << /Length 126 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R17 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.0009 Tc -0.00101 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 136.181 638.3862 Tm (The TABD, for its part, provided a forum for European and U.S. CEOs and)Tj 0.00101 Tc -0.00121 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (trade of\336cials to generate their own agenda and momentum for closer c\ om-)Tj 0.01289 Tc -0.013 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(mercial ties across the Atlantic. \(The United States speci\336cally sou\ ght, and)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.07719 Tw T*(the EU accepted, the exclusion of Canadian businesses from the TABD.\))Tj 0.05791 Tw T*(Indeed, the recommendations of those working within the TABD were a)Tj 0.0157 Tc -0.01579 Tw T*(major factor in the push to harmonize regulations and standards. A direc\ t)Tj 0.01401 Tc -0.0141 Tw T*(result was the set of six Mutual Recognition Agreements \(MRAs\) signed \ by)Tj 0.0148 Tc -0.01489 Tw T*(the United States and the EU in June 1997, which streamlined testing and\ )Tj 0.01379 Tc -0.0139 Tw T*(approval procedures in the sectors of telecommunications, medical equip-\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0984 Tw T*(ment, electromagnetic compatibility, electrical safety, recreational cra\ ft,)Tj 0.1871 Tw T*(and pharmaceutical manufacturing practices. By some estimates, these)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(agreements save U.S. industries alone $1 billion annually.)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 371.674 515.0363 Tm (7)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.15311 Tw 9 0 0 9 136.181 500.3862 Tm (Despite this alphabet soup of smaller agreements, no comprehensive)Tj 0.0141 Tc -0.01421 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (meeting-of-the-minds has been achieved by political leaders on the futur\ e)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.201 Tw T*(shape of transatlantic economic relations, and plenty of disagreement)Tj 0.1153 Tw T*(remains between the two on their visions for the broader international)Tj 0.01221 Tw T*(economy. Indeed, the failure to launch a new round of multilateral trade\ )Tj 0.0941 Tw T*(negotiations in Seattle in 1999 was more a result of the inability of th\ e)Tj 0.048 Tw T*(United States and Europe to cooperate than any protest activities on the\ )Tj 0.0098 Tc -0.0099 Tw T*(streets. Subsequent trade spats have clogged both the newspaper headline\ s)Tj 0.00121 Tc -0.0013 Tw T*(and WTO arbitration mechanisms, though nearly all have ultimately ended)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.008 Tw T*(in compromise. More recent ructions in relations resulting from disagree\ -)Tj 0.0009 Tc -0.0011 Tw T*(ments over Iraq and multilateral cooperation in international security m\ ore)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0123 Tw T*(generally have clouded the very existence of the West as both an emotive\ )Tj 0.198 Tw T*(and practical entity, making ideas of formal commercial integration \320\ )Tj 0.037 Tw T*(which would be as much a political as an economic process \320 that much\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(more distant. )Tj 0.0127 Tc -0.0128 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (However, though no formal, overarching U.S\320EU regime exists to de\336\ ne)Tj 0.00191 Tc -0.002 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (the broad terms of the commercial relationship, there is nevertheless a \ con-)Tj 0.0148 Tc -0.01489 Tw T*(siderable degree of institutionalized cooperation. This institutionaliza\ tion)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0378 Tw T*(exists in the less visible but perhaps more fundamental mid-level of\336\ cial)Tj 0.0155 Tc -0.01559 Tw T*(cooperation and deeply engrained private sector cooperation among both)Tj 0.01511 Tc -0.0152 Tw T*(businesses and civil society organizations. One can think of this relati\ vely)Tj 0.00459 Tc -0.0047 Tw T*(invisible sector of deep, cooperative interaction as a colony of anti-te\ rmites)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0105 Tw T*(in the foundation of an alternate-universe home: they are the undetected\ )Tj 0.1579 Tw T*(beings quietly strengthening the foundation of the house, even as the)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(homeowners argue about how to arrange the furniture. )Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(The European Union and Mexico)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01401 Tc -0.0141 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(For most of the period up to the 1990s, Mexico was but a faint blip on t\ he)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2388 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(European trade radar screen, accounting for less than one percent of)Tj 0.0932 Tw T*(Europe\325s international trade. However, as the EU trade agenda began t\ o)Tj 0.00951 Tw T*(place greater emphasis on increasing trade with less-developed countries\ ,)Tj 0 Tc -0.00011 Tw T*(and as the United States moved toward a free-trade agreement with Mexico\ ,)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (184)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R17 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 184)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 126 0 obj 6745 endobj 127 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 128 0 obj << /Length 129 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R8 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.0002 Tc -0.00031 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (European perceptions began to change. The completion of NAFTA posed an)Tj 0.0033 Tc -0.0034 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(immediate problem for the European Union: it weakened Europe\325s positi\ on)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.00861 Tw T*(in a liberalizing and potentially dynamic Mexico, Latin America\325s sec\ ond)Tj 0.0025 Tc -0.00259 Tw T*(largest market and home to nearly 100 million consumers. These fears wer\ e)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0808 Tw T*(warranted: from a more than 9 percent share of Mexican trade in 1993,)Tj 0.03149 Tw T*(Europe saw its share drop by one-third to 6 percent in 2000. Meanwhile,)Tj 0.27609 Tw T*(the U.S. totals jumped 5 percent \(to a more than 80 percent share\) )Tj 0.16119 Tw T*(over the same period.)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 224.2111 561.0363 Tm (8)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.16119 Tw 9 0 0 9 231.8576 557.8862 Tm (While these trends were clearly in place before)Tj 0.0067 Tc -0.0069 Tw -11.7418 -1.2778 Td (NAFTA, the inauguration of a free trade area in North America promised t\ o)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0164 Tw T*(worsen the EU\325s terms of trade with Mexico, and thus further marginal\ ize)Tj -0.0114 Tw T*(European exporters in that market. The EU\325s response was to initiate,\ and)Tj 0.0106 Tw T*(in 1999 to complete, a bilateral free trade area with Mexico \320 and th\ us to)Tj 0.0164 Tw T*(make Mexico the only country other than Israel to have a FTA with both)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(the EU and the United States.)Tj 0.0033 Tc -0.0034 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The free trade agreement, known of\336cially as the \322Economic Partner\ ship,)Tj 0.0006 Tc -0.0007 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement,\323 or more pithily \(\ if less)Tj 0.0128 Tc -0.01289 Tw T*(modestly\) as the \322Global Agreement,\323 has been referred to by Pasc\ al Lamy)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1497 Tw T*(as \322in terms of coverage the most ambitious free trade agreement ever\ )Tj 0.0108 Tc -0.01089 Tw T*(negotiated by the EU.\323)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 223.4926 434.5363 Tm (9)Tj 0.0108 Tc -0.01089 Tw 9 0 0 9 229.4959 431.3862 Tm (Speci\336cally, the Global Agreement set hard targets)Tj 0.0022 Tc -0.0023 Tw -11.4794 -1.2778 Td (for complete liberalization of trade in industrial goods \(the EU by 1 J\ anuary)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.05 Tw T*(2003; Mexico by 1 January 2007\), and broad liberalization of agricultur\ e)Tj 0.06509 Tw T*(\(by 2010, 80 percent of EU imports and 42 percent of Mexican imports\))Tj 0.2224 Tw T*(and \336sheries \(by 2010, 100 percent of EU imports and 89 percent of)Tj 0.0098 Tc -0.0099 Tw T*(Mexican imports\). It also granted Mexico preferential treatment in the \ ser-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.09821 Tw T*(vices sector, while further liberalizing government procurement, invest-\ )Tj 0.1198 Tw T*(ment, competition, and intellectual property policies. Institutionally, \ it)Tj 0.01109 Tc -0.0112 Tw T*(established a Joint Council, which meets at the ministerial level to uph\ old)Tj 0.0092 Tc -0.0094 Tw T*(the Global Agreement\325s aims \(or \322pillars\323\) of political dialo\ gue, trade liber-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0119 Tw T*(alization, and general cooperation, and which maintains a dispute settle\ -)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(ment mechanism should disagreements arise.)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.01089 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Like the EU, which sought a free trade area with Mexico in large part to\ )Tj -0.00439 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (redress the deterioration of its terms of trade after the creation of NA\ FTA,)Tj 0.2668 Tw T*(Mexico\325s broad motivations for pursuing a deal with Europe are not)Tj 0.0667 Tw T*(dif\336cult to divine. Like Canada, during the 1980s and \(especially\) \ 1990s)Tj 0.0136 Tw T*(Mexico saw its trade dependence on the United States grow to staggering)Tj 0.0952 Tw T*(levels: in 1982, Mexico sent 53 percent of its total exports north of th\ e)Tj -0.0161 Tw T*(border; by 1999 that number had ballooned to 90 percent.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 378.883 227.5363 Tm (10)Tj -0.0161 Tw 9 0 0 9 388.3918 224.3862 Tm (The Mexican)Tj 0.0062 Tc -0.0063 Tw -29.1345 -1.2778 Td (government\325s liberalization policies over this period had increased t\ he pro-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.151 Tw T*(portion of the Mexican economy that was dependent on international)Tj 0.05479 Tw T*(trade, and thus intensi\336ed Mexico\325s vulnerability to economic shoc\ ks in)Tj 0.1021 Tw T*(the United States. Thus, even though Mexico shared the U.S. economic)Tj 0.0148 Tw T*(boom of the late 1990s \(and its recession in 2001\), it had every reaso\ n to)Tj 0.2437 Tw T*(seek to diversify its trade relationships \320 and particularly to embra\ ce)Tj 0.0071 Tw T*(Europe, a market very similar in size and purchasing power to that of th\ e)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 358.5346 663.1211 Tm (Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8.9724 0 Td (185)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R8 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 185)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 129 0 obj 7106 endobj 130 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 131 0 obj << /Length 132 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R7 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.14729 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (United States. Mexico\325s need to reduce its dependency on its northern\ )Tj 0.0051 Tc -0.0052 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(neighbor became more salient with the U.S. administration\325s post-9/11\ dis-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.01961 Tw T*(missal of Mexican initiatives to deepen NAFTA through additional agree-)Tj 0.0018 Tc -0.00191 Tw T*(ments on aid and immigration. Europe in 1982 absorbed over 20 percent of\ )Tj 0.00259 Tc -0.0027 Tw T*(Mexican exports \320 a proportion that had fallen to just 3.1 percent in\ 1999)Tj 0.0027 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 438.4483 595.5363 Tm (11)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1041 Tw 9 0 0 9 127.181 580.8862 Tm (\320 so perhaps a free-trade deal that evened out the playing \336eld )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 31.6246 0 Td (vis-\210-vis)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.0137 Tc -0.01379 Tw -31.6246 -1.2778 Td (NAFTA would reestablish the vitality of this trade relationship, somethi\ ng)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(both the EU and Mexico were keen to encourage.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(The European Union and Canada)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.0016 Tc -0.00169 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(The recent trajectory of the politics of EU\320Canada commercial relatio\ ns has)Tj 0.00169 Tc 1.2778 TL T*(broadly followed that of EU\320U.S. relations. This fact comes as little\ surprise:)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.00121 Tw T*(given the broad political and economic similarities \(in nature, if not \ size\))Tj 0.01131 Tc -0.0114 Tw T*(between North America\325s two advanced industrial countries, one need n\ ot)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.01891 Tw T*(puzzle long over the EU\325s inclination to harmonize its relationships \ with)Tj 0.00349 Tw T*(the two, even as it maintained them separately. Canada \320 always eager\ to)Tj 0.15491 Tw T*(step out of the shadow of its overweening neighbor to the south, and)Tj 0.0112 Tc -0.01131 Tw T*(dependent on the EU as its second largest trading partner \320 has not a\ lways)Tj 0.0085 Tc -0.00861 Tw T*(championed this similar-yet-distinct path, but has yet to prevail on the\ EU)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(to take seriously any new approach to EU\320Canadian relations.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1898 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (During the 1990s, the EU established a set of commercial fora with)Tj -0.01241 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (Canada nearly identical to those it created with the United States. A 19\ 90)Tj 0.0161 Tc -0.0162 Tw T*(joint declaration inaugurated biannual Europe\320Canada summit meetings,\ )Tj 0 Tc -0.00011 Tw T*(which ultimately led to the agreements of the 1996 EU\320Canada Action P\ lan)Tj 0.0123 Tc -0.01241 Tw T*(to erect a framework for bilateral relations and the 1998 EU\320Canada T\ rade)Tj 0.0106 Tc -0.0107 Tw T*(Initiative \(ECTI\) to enhance bilateral cooperation on multilateral iss\ ues, as)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1189 Tw T*(well as to the Canada\320Europe Roundtable \(CERT\), a business-led foru\ m)Tj 0.1268 Tw T*(similar to the TABD. The EU and Canada also negotiated more speci\336c)Tj 0.0139 Tc -0.01401 Tw T*(agreements on customs cooperation in 1997, MRAs in 1998, and competi-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.19839 Tw T*(tion law enforcement in 1999. In nearly every case, these agreements)Tj 0.0126 Tc -0.0127 Tw T*(closely mirrored similar developments in EU negotiations with the United\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw T*(States.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0535 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (This broad parallel to the EU\320U.S. approach occurred despite Ottowa\325\ s)Tj 0.0006 Tc -0.0007 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (various attempts to pursue a separate path in EU\320Canadian relations. \ While)Tj 0.0134 Tc -0.0135 Tw T*(Canada and the United States do share many structural similarities as we\ ll)Tj 0.0143 Tc -0.0144 Tw T*(as common positions on several quarrels with the Europeans \320 notably \ on)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0533 Tw T*(genetically-modi\336ed food and hormone-treated beef \320 the former has\ its)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(own interests to look after in its ties to Europe. While commercial rela\ tions)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.00729 Tw T*(are mostly harmonious, Canada has had several ugly confrontations with)Tj 0.00349 Tc -0.0036 Tw T*(Europe \(and with the Spanish in particular\) over \336shing rights in t\ he North)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.22839 Tw T*(Atlantic off Canada\325s eastern coast. On the positive side, Canada has\ )Tj 0.0144 Tc -0.0145 Tw T*(sought to enhance its commercial relationship with the EU to diversify i\ ts)Tj 0.0011 Tc -0.00121 Tw T*(foreign trade portfolio, which at present is massively dependent on the \ U.S.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1149 Tw T*(market \320 a staggering 86 percent of Canadian exports go to the United\ )Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (186)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R7 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 186)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 132 0 obj 6946 endobj 133 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 134 0 obj << /Length 135 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R3 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.0054 Tc 0 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.2362 Tm (States.)Tj 5.85 0 0 5.85 152.9651 641.3862 Tm (12)Tj -0.00549 Tw 9 0 0 9 162.3271 638.2362 Tm (Moreover, Canada may feel even more acutely than Europeans the)Tj 0.00459 Tc -0.0047 Tw -4.0162 -1.2778 Td (effects of American hegemony, sharing reservations about the intrusions \ of)Tj 0.01311 Tc -0.0132 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(American popular culture and about U.S. positions on international issue\ s)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(such as landmines, arms control, and the International Criminal Court.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.09801 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (However, realizing Canada\325s lesser presence in the Europeans\325 \336\ eld of)Tj 0.00999 Tc -0.0101 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (vision \320 and thus that a separate EU\320Canadian bilateral track is u\ nlikely to)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.3233 Tw T*(promote distinct Canadian interests \320 Canada has sought to embed)Tj 0.0609 Tw T*(EU\320Canadian relations in a broader EU\320NAFTA context. Indeed, Canad\ a)Tj 0.0005 Tc -0.0006 Tw T*(has, like the United Kingdom, sought to play the role of facilitating mi\ ddle-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0116 Tw T*(man in a putative interregional relationship between the EU and NAFTA.)Tj 0.1581 Tw T*(The government of Jean Chretien sought repeatedly in the mid-to-late)Tj 0.01511 Tw T*(1990s to convince European leaders of the merits of a more interregional\ )Tj 0.00861 Tc -0.0087 Tw T*(approach. In 1998, Canada\325s minister of trade, Sergio Marchi, envisio\ ned a)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.05341 Tw T*(time \322when Europe looks to North America [and] sees a NAFTA commu-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(nity, not just three different neighborhoods.\323)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 319.1812 480.3862 Tm (13)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.02859 Tw 9 0 0 9 135.1811 465.7363 Tm (Yet Canada\325s entreaties have received only the most tepid of response\ s)Tj 0.1093 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (from both Commission and European national of\336cials.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 374.9514 457.3862 Tm (14)Tj 0.1093 Tw 9 0 0 9 385.5893 454.2362 Tm (However, the)Tj 0.1066 Tw -28.8231 -1.2778 Td (British government did give support to a speci\336c EU\320NAFTA track: i\ n a)Tj 0.0031 Tw T*(February 2001 speech to the Canadian parliament, British Prime Minister)Tj 0.00639 Tc -0.0065 Tw T*(Tony Blair declared the need for a \322political declaration of intent\323\ between)Tj 0.0144 Tc -0.0145 Tw T*(the EU and NAFTA. It is not clear, however, whether Blair\325s statement\ was)Tj 0.0025 Tc -0.00259 Tw T*(intended to give impetus to an interregional EU\320NAFTA track, to merge\ the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0029 Tw T*(EU\320North American agendas in the run-up to WTO negotiations in Doha)Tj 0.1133 Tw T*(later that year, or simply to humor the Canadian government. What is)Tj 0.0127 Tc -0.0128 Tw T*(clear, however, is that Britain, together with Canada, remains a vital p\ ivot)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.20219 Tw T*(of the transatlantic relationship in all areas, most clearly in trying t\ o)Tj 0.0596 Tw T*(manage a post-9/11 international security agenda, but also in governing)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(transatlantic commercial relations.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(The European Union and NAFTA)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.0294 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(Describing the relationship between the EU and NAFTA is not a straight-)Tj 0.0488 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(forward task, for the simple reason that this interregional track does n\ ot)Tj 0.0071 Tw T*(of\336cially exist. However, it is possible to consider some aspects of \ NAFTA)Tj 0.09801 Tw T*(that would possibly shape a future interregional relationship, as well a\ s)Tj 0.0155 Tc -0.01559 Tw T*(some moves that have been made to date that have sought to create some)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(momentum for an explicit EU\320NAFTA relationship.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.07671 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The EU\325s commercial relations with the North American countries are)Tj -0.0112 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (strong and relatively well maintained. It appears that tariffs are no lo\ nger)Tj 0.0074 Tc -0.00751 Tw T*(an important long-term issue: while there are occasional dif\336culties \ arising)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.04021 Tw T*(from one side\325s imposition of short-term duties to safeguard a strugg\ ling)Tj 0.0161 Tc -0.0162 Tw T*(domestic sector \(e.g., the U.S. steel tariffs of 2002\), the main hindr\ ance to)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0103 Tw T*(greater EU\320North American commerce \320 and the issue addressed in ag\ ree-)Tj 0.01601 Tc -0.0161 Tw T*(ments like the MRAs \320 are nontariff barriers such as subsidies and pr\ oduct)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1311 Tw T*(standards. The primacy that technical issues such as NTBs now take in)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 358.5346 663.1211 Tm (Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8.9724 0 Td (187)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R3 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 187)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 135 0 obj 7004 endobj 136 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 137 0 obj << /Length 138 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R11 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.00999 Tc -0.0101 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (EU\320North American trade relations underscores how deeply integrated t\ he)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.23869 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(two side\325s economies already are. The EU accounts for 35 percent of)Tj 0.0117 Tc -0.0118 Tw T*(\322NAFTA\325s\323 exports \(excluding intra-North American trade\) and \ 25 percent)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.27609 Tw T*(of its imports, and thus is NAFTA\325s most important trading partner.)Tj -0.0137 Tw T*(Together, the EU and NAFTA account for 35 percent of world exports and)Tj 0.0285 Tw T*(over 40 percent of world imports, making the transatlantic link not only\ )Tj 0.0869 Tw T*(central to each side\325s economies, but to the international economy as\ a)Tj 0 Tw T*(whole.)Tj 5.85 0 0 5.85 156.3369 561.0363 Tm (15)Tj 0.0472 Tw 9 0 0 9 166.4153 557.8862 Tm (What happens in transatlantic economic relations \320 whether in)Tj 0.0184 Tw -4.3594 -1.2778 Td (of\336cial trade agreements or disputes, as well as in day-to-day commer\ cial)Tj 0.0482 Tw T*(transactions \320 has repercussions far beyond the arena in which it is \ gov-)Tj 0.0079 Tc -0.008 Tw T*(erned. Whether and how an EU\320NAFTA track were to develop would affect\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.02521 Tw T*(every other trade regime in the world, from bilateral and regional group\ -)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(ings to the WTO itself.)Tj 0.01241 Tc -0.0125 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The future of EU\320North American interregionalism may be broadly con-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0116 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (strained by two internal aspects of NAFTA: its institutionalization and \ its)Tj 0.00481 Tc -0.0049 Tw T*(asymmetry. NAFTA is highly institutionalized: it features a clear set of\ rules)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1082 Tw T*(governing trade between Mexico, Canada, and the United States, and a)Tj 0.0069 Tw T*(dispute settlement mechanism for managing con\337icts that might arise. \ It)Tj 0.0645 Tw T*(also has speci\336c provisions to ensure the integrity of labor and envi\ ron-)Tj 0.01401 Tc -0.0141 Tw T*(mental standards, a feature intended to limit the possible repercussions\ of)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.03729 Tw T*(lax Mexican enforcement in these areas. As such, if the EU were to enter\ )Tj 0.0103 Tc -0.01041 Tw T*(negotiations with NAFTA as an entity, it would be dealing with a bloc th\ at)Tj 0.01109 Tc -0.0112 Tw T*(has a clear institutional identity and purpose \320 if not nearly the de\ pth and)Tj 0.0132 Tc -0.01331 Tw T*(scope of political-economic integration that exists among the countries \ of)Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw T*(Europe.)Tj 0.004 Tc -0.0099 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (However, NAFTA as established in 1995 is not analogous to the European)Tj 0.01131 Tc 0.1937 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (Economic Community in 1958, nor even the European Coal and Steel)Tj 0.0103 Tc -0.0162 Tw T*(Community in 1952. NAFTA is simply a free trade area, which, in the hier\ -)Tj -0.0005 Tc -0.0054 Tw T*(archy of forms of regional institutions, is at the low end. While highly\ insti-)Tj 0.01131 Tc 0.0791 Tw T*(tutionalized, it is minimally \322integrationist.\323 Born of the conver\ gence of)Tj 0.0368 Tw T*(pragmatic self-interest among its members \320 versus the unique context\ of)Tj 0.1868 Tw T*(postwar, \322never again\323 Europe \320 NAFTA is unlikely to develop in\ to an)Tj 0.06911 Tw T*(economic union or customs union in the absence of a major shift in the)Tj 0.1871 Tw T*(international political and economic climate. The main reason for this)Tj 0.0079 Tc -0.01379 Tw T*(ceiling to NAFTA\325s growth seems clear: the overwhelmingly dominant po\ s-)Tj -0.0056 Tc -0.00031 Tw T*(ition of the United States within NAFTA, and the fairly consistent skept\ icism)Tj 0.01131 Tc 0.1086 Tw T*(of the U.S. Congress to U.S. participation in most types of internationa\ l)Tj -0.00011 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(economic institutions. )Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.01199 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Unlike Europe, where a fairly symmetrical distribution of power among)Tj 0.09869 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (the largest member states \(and the traditional Franco\320German axis\) \ has)Tj 0.17371 Tw T*(fostered a political environment of multilateralism and consensus, the)Tj 0.15021 Tw T*(hegemony of the United States and deep, asymmetrical dependence of)Tj 0.033 Tw T*(Canada and Mexico on the U.S. economy place the fate of NAFTA essen-)Tj 0.4077 Tw T*(tially in the relationship between the U.S. administration and the)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (188)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R11 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 188)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 138 0 obj 6762 endobj 139 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 140 0 obj << /Length 141 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R76 gs /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 0 Tr 8 0 0 8 358.5346 663.1211 Tm (Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8.9724 0 Td (189)Tj 0.01401 Tc -0.0141 Tw 9 0 0 9 126.3621 638.3862 Tm (Congress. While Congress in the summer of 2002 \336nally granted the pre\ s-)Tj 0.0029 Tc -0.00301 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(ident \322trade promotion authority\323 \(eight years after it had elaps\ ed\), its hos-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1524 Tw T*(tility to further international trade agreements after the completion of\ )Tj 0.0135 Tw T*(NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of the GATT slowed U.S. participation in)Tj 0.06509 Tw T*(trade negotiations at all levels. The NAFTA debate was particularly ener\ -)Tj 0.0076 Tc -0.00771 Tw T*(vating: while the battle of ideas seemed clearly won by the Clinton admi\ n-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0146 Tw T*(istration in Vice-President Gore\325s 1993 debate with Texas billionaire\ Ross)Tj 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw T*(Perot \(discerner of the \322great sucking sound\323 of U.S. jobs going \ to Mexico\),)Tj 0.01331 Tc -0.0134 Tw T*(its vote gathering for Congressional passage was so painstaking that in \ his)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0136 Tc 0 Tw T*(Doonsbury )Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.0137 Tw 5.0871 0 Td (comic strip cartoonist Gary Larson portrayed Clinton as having)Tj 0.00211 Tc -0.0022 Tw -5.0871 -1.2778 Td (to offer to wash Congresspersons\325 cars in the White House driveway to\ gain)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.13049 Tw T*(their votes. The wounds of that battle are still healing, and thus when)Tj -0.0135 Tw T*(Mexico\325s president-elect Vicente Fox declared in 2000 that NAFTA shou\ ld)Tj 0.0025 Tw T*(become more like the European Union \320 perhaps with structural funds? \ \320)Tj 0.0209 Tw T*(the polite silence he received from Washington was probably the best he)Tj 0.06799 Tw T*(could have hoped for. Hence Canada\325s lonely calls for closer EU\320NA\ FTA)Tj 0.16499 Tw T*(relations, and Mexico\325s hopes for greater intra-NAFTA integration, wi\ ll )Tj 0.27049 Tw T*(both go unheeded unless political conditions change dramatically in)Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw T*(Washington.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0936 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Moreover, despite Congressional dyspepsia after digesting NAFTA and)Tj 0.14101 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (the WTO, NAFTA is probably a transitional set-up, intended more as a)Tj 0.0742 Tw T*(building block toward hemispheric free trade than an end in itself. This\ )Tj 0.05521 Tw T*(state of affairs seems clear from Washington\325s negotiating tactics, w\ hich)Tj 0.01151 Tc -0.0116 Tw T*(have involved wooing countries such as Chile to become NAFTA members)Tj 0.00771 Tc -0.0078 Tw T*(before the creation of a transregional FTAA, thus strengthening the NAFT\ A)Tj 0.0162 Tc -0.0164 Tw T*(model over a more developmentalist version preferred by Brazil and some)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2514 Tw T*(other Latin American countries. This transitional character of NAFTA)Tj 0.1228 Tw T*(means that it is unlikely to take on any greater integrationist elements\ )Tj 0.0081 Tw T*(among current and/or future members; negotiations among all the coun-)Tj -0.0061 Tw T*(tries of the hemisphere toward anything but a straight free trade area \320\ as)Tj 0.06081 Tw T*(opposed to, say, a customs union \320 would be far too dif\336cult to ma\ nage)Tj 0.0105 Tc -0.0106 Tw T*(within the proposed time frame \(negotiations for an FTAA are supposed t\ o)Tj 0.0006 Tc -0.0007 Tw T*(be completed by 2005\). In short, while the unresolved shape of NAFTA is\ in)Tj 0.0168 Tc -0.01691 Tw T*(itself not a barrier to an interregional arrangement with the EU \320 af\ ter all,)Tj 0.0103 Tc -0.01041 Tw T*(the EU itself is constantly evolving in both membership and structure \320\ its)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0182 Tw T*(transitional status as a gateway toward the greater project of a Free Tr\ ade)Tj 0.01221 Tc -0.0123 Tw T*(Area of the Americas makes it likely that both North and South Americans\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0386 Tw T*(as well as Europeans view it as a temporary arrangement. Only if negoti-\ )Tj 0.07269 Tw T*(ations for an FTAA were to break down, or if an FTAA were to fail to be)Tj 0.05991 Tw T*(rati\336ed by the legislature of a key participant, would NAFTA be likel\ y to)Tj 0.02789 Tw T*(take on a more permanent status and potentially make separate trans- or)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(interregional agreements on its own.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 282.1219 170.0363 Tm (16)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0918 Tw 9 0 0 9 135.3621 155.3862 Tm (For these reasons, a related question that this book seeks to address \320\ )Tj 0.00751 Tc -0.0076 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (whether European Union interregional trade initiatives foster \322counte\ rpart)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R76 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 189)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 141 0 obj 6857 endobj 142 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 143 0 obj << /Length 144 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R9 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.0605 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (coherence\323 within the bloc negotiating with the EU \320 would seem to\ be)Tj 0.01289 Tc -0.013 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(answered in the negative in the context of the EU\320NAFTA relationship.\ As)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0265 Tw T*(Alberta Sbragia has indicated, the EU and NAFTA are not \322institutiona\ lly)Tj 0.0105 Tc -0.0106 Tw T*(compatible entities\323 \320 the EU being an economic/monetary union, NA\ FTA)Tj 0.0098 Tc -0.0099 Tw T*(a mere trade/investment union \320 and thus NAFTA does not have any exec\ -)Tj 0.01019 Tc -0.0103 Tw T*(utive with the external negotiating authority similar to the Commission.\ )Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 438.4053 584.0363 Tm (17)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.04739 Tw 9 0 0 9 127.181 569.3862 Tm (While in some cases of interregional relations the EU literally created \ its)Tj 0.00929 Tc -0.0094 Tw T*(counterpart region, NAFTA already exists and will likely evolve only to \ the)Tj 0.00121 Tc -0.0013 Tw T*(extent that Washington allows; there would be no diffusion of institutio\ nal)Tj 0.00079 Tc -0.0009 Tw T*(forms from the EU to NAFTA in the way that there might be among regions)Tj 0.01241 Tc -0.0125 Tw T*(that aspire to EU-like structures. Even if interregional negotiations we\ re to)Tj 0.00211 Tc -0.0022 Tw T*(begin, a transatlantic free trade area would be a discussion between Bru\ ssels)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1441 Tw T*(and Washington. As one British parliamentarian has remarked, \322When)Tj 0.0041 Tc -0.0042 Tw T*(politicians in Europe talk about \324transatlantic,\325 they really mean\ the United)Tj 0.002 Tc -0.00211 Tw T*(States of America. This is an extremely important point that Canadians a\ nd)Tj 0.0011 Tc -0.00121 Tw T*(Mexicans need to appreciate.\323)Tj 0.00121 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 253.7466 469.0363 Tm (18)Tj 0.0011 Tc -0.00121 Tw 9 0 0 9 263.0585 465.8862 Tm (While this situation of institutional incom-)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0148 Tw -15.0975 -1.2778 Td (patibility does not rule out progress in EU\320NAFTA relations, it does \ imply)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(that convergence between the two would remain limited.)Tj 0.01199 Tc -0.0121 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (But the absence of an EU\320NAFTA track is not just \320 or even primari\ ly \320 a)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0818 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (result of NAFTA\325s limitations. The interests of the EU are central to\ this)Tj 0.006 Tc -0.0061 Tw T*(story. So the question remains: why has there been little impetus in the\ EU)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.002 Tw T*(to develop an EU\320NAFTA track, and what factors will shape the prospec\ ts)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(of transatlantic interregionalism in the near future?)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw 10 0 0 10 127.181 359.8862 Tm [(3)-1197.3(Explaining the non-regime)]TJ /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.1153 Tw 9 0 0 9 127.181 339.3862 Tm (What follows is an assessment of four different potential sources of EU)Tj 0.00439 Tc -0.00459 Tw T*(trade preferences )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 8.2608 0 Td (vis-\210-vis)Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.0045 Tw 3.8986 0 Td (the countries of North America. Given the course)Tj 0.0145 Tc -0.0146 Tw -12.1594 -1.2778 Td (of events to date, they represent different possible factors that explai\ n the)Tj 0.0023 Tc -0.0024 Tw T*(absence of \320 and whose change could potentially create an impetus for\ \320 an)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(EU push for an interregional relationship with NAFTA.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.006 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(Interest group pluralism)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.19611 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(From the perspective of European interest groups \(particularly speci\336\ c)Tj 0.1132 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(industries and \336rms\), the question regarding commercial relations wi\ th)Tj 0.0062 Tc -0.0063 Tw T*(North America is clear: what do we want that we do not already have? And\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0262 Tw T*(the question for analysts is: is what they want comprehensive enough to)Tj 0.0031 Tw T*(lead them to band together to advocate a project as big as a Transatlant\ ic)Tj 0.01241 Tc -0.0126 Tw T*(Free Trade Area \320 and to do so with enough vigor to overcome other po\ lit-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(ical and economic obstacles to a TAFTA?)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0753 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (To address these questions it is essential to understand which interest)Tj -0.011 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (groups want what and why. Some European actors \320 such as \336nancial \ ser-)Tj 0.03709 Tw T*(vices, environmental technologies, and knowledge-based industries \320 a\ re)Tj 0.0047 Tc -0.0049 Tw T*(well-disposed toward free trade in general due to their relative competi\ tive-)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (190)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R9 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 190)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 144 0 obj 6957 endobj 145 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 146 0 obj << /Length 147 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R14 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.0251 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (ness in international markets. Many of these same industries are particu\ -)Tj 0.19769 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(larly interested in maintaining free access to North American markets)Tj 0.0116 Tc -0.0117 Tw T*(because their interests there are intra\336rm. The acceleration in merge\ rs and)Tj 0.0085 Tc -0.00861 Tw T*(acquisitions \(M&A\) activity has created a set of multinational corpora\ tions)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.05099 Tw T*(such as DaimlerChrysler and the Virgin Group that form a truly transat-)Tj 0.00391 Tc -0.004 Tw T*(lantic constituency and which would have much to lose if any sort of tra\ de)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.03979 Tw T*(war were to break out. Many of these and other free trade-oriented \336r\ ms)Tj 0.01601 Tw T*(have been active in the business-led fora of the TABD and the CERT, and)Tj 0.0062 Tc -0.0063 Tw T*(were important players behind the Mutual Recognition Agreements the EU)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0547 Tw T*(signed with the United States and Canada in 1998 to reduce testing and)Tj 0.0047 Tc -0.0049 Tw T*(certi\336cation costs.)Tj 0.00481 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 202.786 526.5363 Tm (19)Tj 0.0047 Tc -0.00481 Tw 9 0 0 9 212.14 523.3862 Tm (Indeed, the Commission is explicitly solicitous of busi-)Tj 0.004 Tc -0.0041 Tw -9.551 -1.2778 Td (ness group advocacy: Lamy, addressing a meeting of the TABD, asked CEOs)Tj 0.01469 Tc -0.0148 Tw T*(to \322keep the pressure on us\323 for continued transatlantic liberaliz\ ation.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 428.3156 503.5363 Tm (20)Tj 9 0 0 9 437.7865 500.3862 Tm (If)Tj 0.01489 Tc -0.015 Tw -34.6228 -1.2778 Td (the United States continues to use \322carousel\323 retaliation against \ European)Tj 0.0108 Tc -0.01089 Tw T*(imports \(i.e., rotating the affected products\) in response to EU nonco\ mpli-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1442 Tw T*(ance with certain WTO rulings against its trade practices, a number of)Tj 0.0498 Tw T*(previously unmobilized industries might in fact increase the pressure on\ )Tj -0.00751 Tw T*(the EU to \336nd new ways to address the con\337icts in the transatlanti\ c trade)Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw T*(relationship.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.05231 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Arrayed against this set of pro-free-trade groups are a number of polit-\ )Tj 0.1469 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (ically in\337uential sectors that are a great deal more skeptical about \ any)Tj 0.2168 Tw T*(moves toward trade liberalization with North America. Some of these)Tj 0.0164 Tc -0.01649 Tw T*(sectors \320 such as textiles, steel, and, of course, agriculture \320 w\ ere molli\336ed)Tj 0.0038 Tc -0.00391 Tw T*(in the context of the EU\320Mexico free trade agreement because it postp\ oned)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0094 Tw T*(any adjustments they would have to make until well into the future. The)Tj 0.0155 Tc -0.0157 Tw T*(date for Europe\325s removal of trade barriers in the agricultural and \336\ sheries)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0024 Tw T*(areas \(2010\) comes well after the expected completion of the Millenniu\ m)Tj 0.05811 Tw T*(Round of WTO negotiations and the accession of new Central European)Tj 0.0977 Tw T*(members into the EU, both of which are likely to force the EU to open)Tj 0.33591 Tw T*(these sectors to greater international competition anyway. However,)Tj 0.01379 Tw T*(certain sectoral sticking points with the United States and Canada \320 \ with)Tj 0.0024 Tc -0.0025 Tw T*(whom trade is generally free but for which no comprehensive formal agree\ -)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.00819 Tw T*(ment exists \320 would arouse more opposition within Europe. In particul\ ar,)Tj 0.1123 Tw T*(EU\320Canadian sensitivities on \336sheries remain raw, and attempts by \ the)Tj -0.00819 Tw T*(Commission to rein in the EU \337eet have met stiff opposition, particul\ arly)Tj 0.1891 Tw T*(from the Spanish.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 206.9296 239.0363 Tm (21)Tj 0.1891 Tw 9 0 0 9 218.2857 235.8862 Tm (Meanwhile, the United States and Canada remain)Tj -0.0159 Tw -10.2338 -1.2778 Td (opposed to EU moves to keep hormone-treated beef and other genetically)Tj 0.15891 Tw T*(modi\336ed organisms out of European markets, and it is hard to see EU)Tj 0.21741 Tw T*(farmers \320 and perhaps consumers as well \320 accepting compromise on \ )Tj 0.1199 Tw T*(this issue.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 169.895 193.0364 Tm (22)Tj 0.1198 Tw 9 0 0 9 180.6273 189.8862 Tm (More generally, recent additions to traditional safeguards \320)Tj 0.21069 Tw -6.0496 -1.2778 Td (including huge increases in farm supports in the United States and a)Tj 0.01691 Tw T*(Franco\320German agreement to retain CAP supports even in the face of EU\ )Tj 0.01089 Tc -0.011 Tw T*(enlargement \320 seem to make any agreement that actually reduces suppor\ ts)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(a distant dream, at least within the EU\320North American context.)Tj /F3 1 Tf 8 0 0 8 358.5346 663.1211 Tm (Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8.9724 0 Td (191)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R14 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 191)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 147 0 obj 7143 endobj 148 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 149 0 obj << /Length 150 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R13 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 0 Tr 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (192)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01469 Tc -0.0148 Tw 9 0 0 9 136 638.3862 Tm (Other \322problem sectors\323 might not be quite as intractable. For ins\ tance,)Tj 0.0047 Tc -0.00481 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (the EU shares a common position on textiles liberalization with the Unit\ ed)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.02319 Tw 1.2778 TL T*[(States, Canada, and)-327.4(Mexico \(along with Turkey, an EU aspirant\), with all)]TJ 0.1508 Tw T*(agreeing to work together to \336ght off the demands of India and other)Tj 0.1488 Tw T*(developing countries that they make concessions in WTO negotiations)Tj 0.0153 Tc -0.0154 Tw T*(beyond those agreed in the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which is)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0927 Tw T*(in force until 2005. Meanwhile, the row over the Bush administration\325\ s)Tj 0.2021 Tw T*(imposition in 2002 of temporary tariffs on steel imports \(from which)Tj 0.1037 Tw T*(Canada and Mexico were notably exempted\) died down as Washington)Tj 0.00929 Tw T*(waived restrictions on an ever-growing proportion of imports, suggesting\ )Tj 0.00819 Tc -0.0083 Tw T*(that the safeguard action was a tactical maneuver to forestall oppositio\ n of)Tj 0.0036 Tc -0.00369 Tw T*(the U.S. steel industry to the passage of trade promotion authority.)Tj 0.00369 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 409.5191 515.0363 Tm (23)Tj 0.0036 Tc -0.0038 Tw 9 0 0 9 418.8604 511.8862 Tm (Still, a)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2496 Tw -32.4289 -1.2778 Td (surge in U.S. protection in several industries sensitive in both North)Tj 0.0135 Tc -0.0136 Tw T*(America and Europe is unlikely to put European producers in the mood to)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(accept a rollback in their own protection.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0213 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Given the relative parity between European free-trade groups and their)Tj 0.004 Tc -0.0041 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (more skeptical counterparts, and the relative acceptability of the statu\ s quo)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.02859 Tw T*(to all involved, there has not been, and seems to be little prospect of,\ an)Tj 0.0647 Tw T*(interest group-led groundswell for a TAFTA. Yet the logic for such a fre\ e)Tj 0.01421 Tc -0.0143 Tw T*(trade area does exist. Some have suggested that the Global Agreement was\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1936 Tw T*(just a way for European \336rms to get better access to the U.S. market,\ )Tj 0.0108 Tc -0.01089 Tw T*(making Mexico \322a gateway rather than a destination,\323 a \322springb\ oard into)Tj 0.00079 Tc -0.0009 Tw T*(the United States.\323)Tj 0.0009 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 205.8825 388.5363 Tm (24)Tj 0.00079 Tc -0.0009 Tw 9 0 0 9 215.1907 385.3862 Tm (However, if this were the case, why not push for a deal)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0071 Tw -9.799 -1.2778 Td (that cuts out the middleman? Would European \336rms not prefer a straigh\ t)Tj 0.08299 Tw T*(deal with the United States, or all of NAFTA, given the maze of rules of\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(origin provisions that NAFTA set up to try to clog this gateway? )Tj 0.0108 Tc -0.01089 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Reasons for pro-free trade business groups to push for a TAFTA exist, bu\ t)Tj 0.015 Tc -0.01511 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (either have not been envisioned as part of a broader free trade project,\ are)Tj 0.00391 Tc -0.004 Tw T*(not all that compelling, or have not effectively been promoted through t\ he)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(Commission or national governments. Thus a focus on interest group pres-\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1339 Tw T*(sures is not only insuf\336cient to explain the absence of an EU push fo\ r)Tj 0.0105 Tc -0.0106 Tw T*(TAFTA \(overall, it would bene\336t most sectors, and the sensitive ones\ could)Tj 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw T*(simply be left out of liberalization\), but, given recent experience, we\ would)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0983 Tw T*(simply expect sectoral groups to push for their own arrangements \(e.g.,\ )Tj 0.0071 Tc -0.00729 Tw T*(MRAs\) rather than build intersectoral alliances for broader free trade.\ Some)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.07941 Tw T*(sort of inherent \322state\323 interests seem necessary to explain the s\ hape of)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(transatlantic trade relations. )Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(EU institutional processes)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc -0.0029 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(To some extent, the EU\325s disinclination to pursue an interregional ac\ cord)Tj 0.2252 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(with North America might be better understood as a function of the)Tj 0.20799 Tw T*(continued dominance of the Council over the Commission in setting )Tj 0.01019 Tc -0.01041 Tw T*(the broad direction of European trade policy.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 319.6703 158.5363 Tm (25)Tj -0.0103 Tw 9 0 0 9 329.0883 155.3862 Tm (While in the late 1990s the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2186 Tw -22.4543 -1.2778 Td (Commission appeared well-disposed toward some form of TAFTA, the)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R13 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 192)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 150 0 obj 7116 endobj 151 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 152 0 obj << /Length 153 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R5 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.0081 Tc -0.00819 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (voices of skeptical member states in the Council have stymied any forwar\ d)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(movement on this front.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1071 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (In the mid-1990s, the Delors Commission was riding the wave of big)Tj 0.0013 Tc -0.0014 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (thinking that led to the creation of the single market, plans for a sing\ le cur-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.13429 Tw T*(rency, and, perhaps most ambitiously, the establishment of a common)Tj 0.0112 Tc -0.01131 Tw T*(foreign and security policy \(CFSP\) \320 the last of which the Commissi\ on was)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1129 Tw T*(eager to see fall under its own purview. Yet the only real authority the\ )Tj -0.0172 Tw T*(Commission maintained in external affairs was in trade negotiations \(le\ ss)Tj 0.032 Tw T*(so in actual trade policymaking\). However, in an era when trade increas\ -)Tj 0.00681 Tc -0.0069 Tw T*(ingly came to be seen as strategic, the Commission perhaps wanted to gai\ n)Tj 0.0002 Tc -0.00031 Tw T*(backdoor entrance into a CFSP through expanding its power of initiation \ in)Tj 0.01489 Tc -0.015 Tw T*(trade policy. Given the importance \320 and unsettled state \320 of tran\ satlantic)Tj 0.0051 Tc -0.0052 Tw T*(relations after the end of the cold war, the Commission broadened its ho\ ri-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0992 Tw T*(zons on liberalizing commercial relations across the Atlantic from mere)Tj -0.0166 Tw T*(technical agreements \(though it never actually neglected these\) to a m\ ore)Tj 0.0078 Tc -0.0079 Tw T*(ambitious TAFTA. In 1998, EU trade commissioner Sir Leon Brittan pushed)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0063 Tw T*(hard for a comprehensive transatlantic \(speci\336cally, EU\320U.S.\) tr\ ade agree-)Tj 0.07381 Tw T*(ment. However, the Council, animated by France\325s hostility to the ide\ a,)Tj 0.02499 Tw T*(demurred. Though the Commission may remain interested in the TAFTA)Tj 0.0784 Tw T*(concept, it has since reverted to resting its position on technical, rat\ her)Tj 0.11369 Tw T*(than strategic, grounds: it supports TAFTA \322provided that a strong ec\ o-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(nomic case can be made for a transatlantic accord.\323)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 344.3421 400.0363 Tm (26)Tj 0.01421 Tc 0.1427 Tw 9 0 0 9 135.1811 385.3862 Tm (Despite the Commission\325s continued desire for task expansion in the)Tj 0.01221 Tc -0.0152 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (foreign affairs milieu, and the advance of quali\336ed majority voting \(\ QMV\))Tj 0.00841 Tc -0.0114 Tw T*(in the Council, intra-Council politics and norms provide a tight constra\ int)Tj 0.0106 Tc -0.0136 Tw T*(on any Commission ambitions toward negotiating an interregional accord)Tj 0.01421 Tc 0.19209 Tw T*(with NAFTA. The independent foreign policies of Britain, France, and,)Tj 0.0051 Tc -0.0081 Tw T*(increasingly, Germany make the Council a powerful brake on any EU\320wid\ e)Tj 0.00681 Tc -0.0098 Tw T*(foreign policy, which would require the support of each of the big membe\ r)Tj 0.00259 Tc -0.0056 Tw T*(states as well as most if not all of the smaller states. Moreover, the s\ pread of)Tj -0.0007 Tc -0.0023 Tw T*(QMV is not likely to progress quickly in matters of international affair\ s, and)Tj -0.0018 Tc -0.00121 Tw T*(the prevailing consensus norm in the Council further hinders strong poli\ cy-)Tj 0.01421 Tc 0.07719 Tw T*(making even in areas where majority voting formally applies. Therefore,)Tj 0.0045 Tc -0.00751 Tw T*(even as the Commission seeks greater latitude to pursue transatlantic de\ als,)Tj 0.01421 Tc 0.03329 Tw T*(the Council seeks to tie its hands. So it was with the EU\320U.S. Blair \ House)Tj 0.11951 Tw T*(agreement over agriculture at the climax of the Uruguay Round negoti-)Tj 0.04961 Tw T*(ations of GATT in 1992: though the Commission, then at the apex of its)Tj -0.0022 Tc -0.00079 Tw T*(in\337uence under Delors, managed to broker a deal, the disapproval of c\ ertain)Tj 0.0027 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(EU member states later allowed the Council to unravel the agreement.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 421.9691 204.5363 Tm (27)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.086 Tw 9 0 0 9 135.1811 189.8862 Tm (Further hampering any Commission capacity to pursue a TAFTA is its)Tj 0.0011 Tc -0.00121 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (own internal institutional fragmentation in trade policy. Again, the agr\ icul-)Tj 0.0125 Tc -0.0126 Tw T*(tural sector provides an example. The locus of authority in EU agricultu\ ral)Tj 0.006 Tc -0.0062 Tw T*(trade is the Directorate-General of Agriculture \(DG Agriculture\) rathe\ r than)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1521 Tw T*(DG Trade. As a result, European farmers \320 which are protected against\ )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 358.5346 663.1211 Tm (Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8.9724 0 Td (193)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R5 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 193)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 153 0 obj 7027 endobj 154 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 155 0 obj << /Length 156 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R21 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.29401 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (external competition by the EU\325s Common Agricultural Policy, well-)Tj 0.10719 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(organized in their determination to maintain this protection, and well-)Tj 0.092 Tw T*(connected to their regulators in DG Agriculture \320 are essentially abl\ e to)Tj 0.0043 Tc -0.00439 Tw T*(dictate terms to the Commission on agricultural trade policy. As Cadot a\ nd)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.5545 Tw T*(Webber have shown, this fragmentation of authority within the)Tj 0.1216 Tw T*(Commission goes a long way to explain a recent, particularly corrosive)Tj 0.00681 Tc -0.0069 Tw T*(transatlantic spat over trade in bananas. In this case, the strong posit\ ion in)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2946 Tw T*(DG Agriculture \(and with certain member governments\) of minority)Tj 0.0154 Tc -0.0155 Tw T*(banana-trading interests made compromise both internally within the EU)Tj 0.0032 Tc -0.0033 Tw T*(and externally with the United States extremely dif\336cult.)Tj 0.0033 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 367.4534 538.0363 Tm (28)Tj 0.0032 Tc -0.0034 Tw 9 0 0 9 376.7901 534.8862 Tm (Alternatively, in)Tj 0.0164 Tc -0.01649 Tw -27.7343 -1.2778 Td (negotiations in which the EU is asymmetrically powerful and thus able to\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0307 Tw T*(satisfy the demands of powerful domestic sectors \320 as with agricultur\ e in)Tj 0.01041 Tc -0.0105 Tw T*(the Global Agreement \320 this institutional fragmentation is less conse\ quen-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0872 Tw T*(tial. More generally, the combination of the Commission\325s institution\ al)Tj 0.00481 Tc -0.0049 Tw T*(fragmentation and its reliance on close connections to the interests it \ regu-)Tj 0.0034 Tc -0.0036 Tw T*(lates \(a feature of national bureaucracies everywhere\) would make the \ com-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0789 Tw T*(promises necessary in bargaining \320 or even agenda-setting \320 with a\ peer)Tj 0.0069 Tc -0.007 Tw T*(counterpart such as the United States/NAFTA quite dif\336cult. Unless ne\ goti-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.00751 Tw T*(ations on key sectors such as agriculture were either pushed well into t\ he)Tj 0.16991 Tw T*(future or left off the agenda entirely, it is easy to see how tightly th\ e)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(Commission\325s hands are tied )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 13.8799 0 Td (vis-\210-vis)Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.00571 Tw 3.9096 0 Td (a TAFTA. )Tj 0.0123 Tc -0.01241 Tw -16.7894 -1.2778 Td (This \322institutionalist\323 view provides a plausible account of the o\ bstacles)Tj 0.0094 Tc -0.00951 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (facing the constituency of pro-TAFTA of\336cials in the European Union, \ and)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.06641 Tw T*(thus the absence of a strong push toward a broad-based agreement with)Tj 0.0018 Tc -0.00191 Tw T*(North America. Yet if trade with North America is indeed \322strategic\323\ for the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0795 Tw T*(EU and its constituent member states, we have yet to \336nd a convincing\ )Tj 0.0061 Tc -0.0062 Tw T*(source of the Union\325s strategic preferences \(given the relatively na\ rrow and)Tj 0.01669 Tc -0.0168 Tw T*(technical agenda of \336rms and industry groups, and the internally-focu\ sed)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0139 Tw T*(tug-of-war between the Commission and the Council\). Explanations that)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(consider Europe\325s place in the world may offer some clues here.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(Balance of \(economic\) power and nesting considerations)Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.0058 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(Another approach to understanding EU trade policy toward North America)Tj 0.0047 Tc -0.00481 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(focuses on how the Union derives its trade preferences from consideratio\ ns)Tj 0.0029 Tc -0.00301 Tw T*(of the economic \322balance of power,\323 particularly )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 23.154 0 Td (vis-\210-vis)Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.00301 Tw 3.8851 0 Td (the United States,)Tj 0.0098 Tc -0.0099 Tw -27.0391 -1.2778 Td (and how the terms of this economic, and ultimately political, competitio\ n)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(might bene\336t the EU relative to its American competitor.)Tj 0.0135 Tc -0.0022 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Europeans have in recent years shown less willingness to sti\337e their \ dis-)Tj 0.0278 Tc -0.01649 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (satisfaction with Washington\325s tendency to pursue unilateral policies\ in)Tj 0.02541 Tc -0.0141 Tw T*(various arenas of international politics. What\325s more, the two have b\ een)Tj 0.0256 Tc -0.0143 Tw T*(beating each other about the head and shoulders with the WTO stick on)Tj 0.0285 Tc 0.0134 Tw T*(various trade-related issues. As noted above, such transatlantic rows ar\ e)Tj 0.0578 Tw T*(nothing new; yet they may have taken on a different quality since the)Tj 0.0424 Tw T*(collapse of the Soviet Union removed the common security threat that)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (194)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R21 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 194)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 156 0 obj 7135 endobj 157 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 158 0 obj << /Length 159 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R28 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.0285 Tc 0.01379 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (served to limit the fallout of these con\337icts. Even more recent disag\ ree-)Tj 0.15849 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(ments, whether over the American rejection of binding international )Tj 0.13741 Tw T*(law and agreements \(e.g., the Kyoto protocol on global warming, the)Tj 0.02769 Tc -0.0164 Tw T*(Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, or the International Criminal Court\) or \ pre-)Tj 0.02859 Tc 0.1431 Tw T*(emptive pursuit of post-September 11 security objectives \(e.g., war in)Tj 0.0273 Tc -0.01601 Tw T*(Iraq\), have reinforced perceptions that Europe and America increasingly\ )Tj 0.0141 Tc -0.00279 Tw T*(stand apart on the vital matters of the day, and that, although overt se\ cu-)Tj 0.0285 Tc 0.0508 Tw T*(rity competition between the two remains unlikely, political-economic)Tj 0.0246 Tc -0.01331 Tw T*(competition is ever less constrained by a clear, mutually-perceived set \ of)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(shared interests.)Tj 0.0112 Tc -0.01131 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (In this view of U.S.\320European relations, we would expect EU preferenc\ es)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0582 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (in trade to derive from a desire to increase the Union\325s in\337uence \ on the)Tj -0.01489 Tw T*(world stage )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 5.7531 0 Td (vis-\210-vis)Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.01489 Tw 4.0152 0 Td (the United States. This expectation does not immedi-)Tj 0.04849 Tw -9.7683 -1.2778 Td (ately preclude the pursuit of a trade agreement between the two sides of\ )Tj 0.15939 Tw T*(the Atlantic; most policymakers might be expected to understand that)Tj 0.0376 Tw T*(trade is not zero-sum, and that a trade war between the two would leave)Tj 0.0076 Tc -0.00771 Tw T*(both worse off. Rather, the EU might be expected to pursue trade strateg\ ies)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.03481 Tw T*(that would engage the United States in an agreement \320 whether through\ )Tj 0.006 Tc -0.0061 Tw T*(the WTO or in a trans-/interregional deal \320 whose terms re\337ected t\ he inter-)Tj 0.0078 Tc -0.0079 Tw T*(ests of Europe more than those of the United States, and thus provided r\ el-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0925 Tw T*(ative gains to the former. However, it is dif\336cult to see how the Uni\ ted)Tj 0.0976 Tw T*(States would agree to such an arrangement; hence we might expect the)Tj 0.008 Tc -0.0081 Tw T*(European Union to prefer a hub-and-spoke strategy toward other countries\ )Tj 0.0002 Tc -0.00031 Tw T*(and regions that institutionalized relatively powerful EU\325s preferenc\ es while)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(seeking to shut out the United States. )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1391 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (To some extent such a strategy seems to be evident in the European)Tj 0.0022 Tc -0.0023 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (approach to the Americas. To date, the EU has strictly adhered to a bila\ teral)Tj 0.00369 Tc -0.0038 Tw T*(approach toward each of the countries of North America, which maximizes)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.44 Tw T*(the EU\325s bargaining power )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 14.7881 0 Td (vis-\210-vis)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.44 Tw 4.4701 0 Td (each of them while excluding)Tj 0.00169 Tc -0.0018 Tw -19.2582 -1.2778 Td (Washington\325s direct in\337uence from any negotiations bar those betwe\ en the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0385 Tw T*(EU and United States \(except, of course, in WTO negotiations\). The EU\325\ s)Tj 0.0144 Tc -0.0145 Tw T*(interregional negotiations with MERCOSUR, for their part, seem to be not\ )Tj 0.0052 Tc -0.00529 Tw T*(so much motivated by the desire to maximize bargaining power, but rather\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.01801 Tw T*(by the specter of a future FTAA. That is, deals with Latin America are n\ ot)Tj 0.23849 Tw T*(only part of a proactive strategy to maximize Europe\325s in\337uence an\ d)Tj 0.0174 Tw T*(market access, but rather a reaction to similar American initiatives in \ the)Tj 0 Tw T*(region.)Tj 5.85 0 0 5.85 156.6323 227.5363 Tm (29)Tj 0.08549 Tw 9 0 0 9 167.0557 224.3862 Tm (The EU\325s overt rationale for concluding a free trade agreement)Tj 0.097 Tw -4.5416 -1.2778 Td (with Mexico in 1999 was to redress the \322NAFTA effect,\323 speci\336ca\ lly the)Tj 0.1398 Tw T*(Europeans\325 worsened terms of trade with Mexico.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 348.0746 204.5363 Tm (30)Tj 0.1398 Tw 9 0 0 9 358.9867 201.3863 Tm (Its ongoing negoti-)Tj 0.0166 Tw -25.8673 -1.2778 Td (ations with MERCOSUR suggest a preemptive move against similar losses)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(from the creation of an FTAA. )Tj 0.0074 Tc -0.00751 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Similar positional considerations were also important in the EU\325s pur\ suit)Tj 0.0089 Tc -0.009 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (of interregional ties with an even more strategically important region, \ East)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1414 Tw T*(Asia. Europeans reacted with some dismay to the coming-of-age of the )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 358.5346 663.1211 Tm (Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8.9724 0 Td (195)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R28 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 195)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 159 0 obj 7141 endobj 160 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 161 0 obj << /Length 162 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R16 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.1955 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (U.S.-led Asia\320Paci\336c Economic Cooperation \(APEC\) forum in 1993\320\ 94,)Tj 0.0463 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(which threatened to privilege U.S. trade with this dynamic region at the\ )Tj 0.0121 Tc -0.01221 Tw T*(expense of an emerging Eurasian relationship. The European response was)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1441 Tw T*(to sponsor, in 1996, the creation of the Asia\320Europe Meetings \(ASEM\)\ ,)Tj 0.0051 Tc -0.0052 Tw T*(which promised to promote and institutionalize commercial ties along thi\ s)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0965 Tw T*(relatively underdeveloped third leg of international economic relations.\ )Tj 0.0043 Tc -0.00439 Tw T*(Notably, this relationship was conceived as one among equals \320 despit\ e the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0042 Tw T*(relative institutional poverty among the countries of East Asia \320 and\ thus)Tj 0.0024 Tc -0.0025 Tw T*(from a strategic angle served less as a part of an EU-centered hub-and-s\ poke)Tj 0.0153 Tc -0.0154 Tw T*(strategy and more as a pragmatic response to the ascension of APEC. And,\ )Tj 0.00751 Tc -0.0076 Tw T*(though it is hard to make precise statements about cause and effect here\ , it)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.006 Tw T*(is notable that ASEM\325s forward momentum slowed nearly simultaneously)Tj -0.0005 Tw T*(to the deceleration of the APEC process.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 300.8585 503.5363 Tm (31)Tj -0.0005 Tw 9 0 0 9 310.5076 500.3862 Tm (The more general point is that,)Tj 0.0045 Tc -0.00459 Tw -20.3696 -1.2778 Td (like the United States, the EU appears to be not only hedging its bets i\ n the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0554 Tw T*(face of the possible breakdown of multilateral liberalization through th\ e)Tj 0.0018 Tc -0.00191 Tw T*[(WTO, but also seeking to improve relative)-287.1(access to key developing country)]TJ 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw T*(markets.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.07651 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Perhaps paradoxically, a central assumption underpinning an analysis)Tj 0.0043 Tc -0.00439 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (that focuses on the EU and United States pursuing their interests separa\ tely)Tj 0.00571 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(is the continued stability of the transatlantic relationship itself. But\ what if)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0598 Tw T*(this assumption were false \320 what if the vitality of EU\320U.S. polit\ ical and)Tj 0.0439 Tw T*(economic relationship were fundamentally challenged by either internal)Tj 0.0081 Tc -0.00819 Tw T*(dissention \(e.g., the cumulative weight of successive trade-related dis\ agree-)Tj 0.0126 Tc -0.0127 Tw T*(ments, or the collapse of NATO\), or if a credible external threat to we\ stern)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0793 Tw T*(civilization were to arise? In any of these scenarios might we expect EU\ )Tj 0.4248 Tw T*(\(and U.S.\) policymakers to make a political statement by strongly)Tj -0.015 Tw T*(reaf\336rming and strengthening the transatlantic link through formal co\ m-)Tj 0.00011 Tc -0.0002 Tw T*(mercial integration? The answer probably remains no, for the simple reas\ on)Tj 0.0022 Tc -0.0023 Tw T*(that doing so would be tantamount to the West turning its back on the re\ st)Tj 0.0051 Tc -0.00529 Tw T*(of the world, a decision that European \(and American\) policymakers wou\ ld)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.18559 Tw T*(have dif\336culty contemplating even under the most dire circumstances)Tj 0.0159 Tc -0.01601 Tw T*(given its wide-ranging political implications. Politically, creating a T\ AFTA)Tj 0.00169 Tc -0.0018 Tw T*(in reaction to global turmoil would suggest EU acquiescence in the creat\ ion)Tj 0.0061 Tc -0.0062 Tw T*(of civilizational fault lines; economically, there would be the tangible\ costs)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.065 Tw T*(to the European producers and consumers of de-globalizing the interna-)Tj 0.0688 Tw T*(tional economy. Even during the darkest days of the Cold War, when it)Tj 0.0116 Tc -0.0117 Tw T*(actually seemed possible that the West might stand alone against a hosti\ le)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.01981 Tw T*(world, no serious steps toward formal transatlantic economic integration\ )Tj 0.12331 Tw T*(were taken. Such steps seem even more distant in the post-9/11 world,)Tj 0.0127 Tc -0.0128 Tw T*(despite the fact that the West as a whole is a major target of globally \ oper-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0462 Tw T*(ating terrorist networks. While these scenarios are merely counterfactua\ l)Tj 0.0083 Tc -0.00841 Tw T*(speculations, they do suggest that there is little strategic reason for \ the cre-)Tj 0.0032 Tc -0.0033 Tw T*(ation of a transatlantic free trade area, whether under current conditio\ ns or)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(in the foreseeable future.)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (196)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R16 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 196)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 162 0 obj 6951 endobj 163 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 164 0 obj << /Length 165 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R12 gs /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 0 Tr 8 0 0 8 358.5346 663.1211 Tm (Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8.9724 0 Td (197)Tj 0.01421 Tc -0.00861 Tw 9 0 0 9 135.3621 638.3862 Tm (Nesting considerations, for their part, do not seem to be a central fact\ or)Tj 0.01131 Tc -0.00571 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (in this case. For one thing, there are no EU\320NAFTA rules in existence\ or in)Tj 0.0065 Tc -0.0009 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(discussion that might need to be made consistent with WTO rules. Indeed,\ )Tj 0.0164 Tc -0.0108 Tw T*(to the extent that the EU has pursued arrangements with these two coun-)Tj 0.0228 Tc 0.1499 Tw T*(tries \320 such as in the ITA or MRAs \320 it has done so outside the WT\ O)Tj 0.0097 Tc -0.0041 Tw T*(domain because all these countries did not believe that suf\336ciently l\ iberal-)Tj 0.0228 Tc 0.17821 Tw T*(izing agreements could be had within a WTO-centered approach. But)Tj 0.2347 Tw T*(while WTO-consistency remains a nonissue in EU relations with the)Tj 0.07919 Tw T*(United States and Canada, nesting did to some extent shape the provi-)Tj 0.01939 Tc -0.01379 Tw T*(sions of the Global Agreement with Mexico \(and, on the North American)Tj 0.0228 Tc 0.0778 Tw T*(side, NAFTA\). Still, while global rules are an essential feature of the\ EU)Tj 0.14549 Tw T*(economic relations with the countries of North America, nesting con-)Tj 0.0222 Tc -0.0166 Tw T*(straints have not been a primary factor in the absence of a formal regim\ e)Tj 0.0114 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(between the two. )Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(Transatlantic identities, convergent or divergent)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.2606 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(We might also look to the realm of ideas and identities to generate)Tj 0.0061 Tc -0.0062 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(explanations for European trade preferences toward North America. In par\ -)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0117 Tw T*(ticular, we might consider the fate of \322the West\323 \320 and how pol\ icymakers)Tj 0.0025 Tc -0.00259 Tw T*(view the fate of the West \320 as a useful guide to whether Europeans wi\ ll look)Tj 0.00661 Tc -0.00681 Tw T*(to increase or circumscribe their commercial relations with North Americ\ a.)Tj 0.0071 Tc -0.0072 Tw T*(Once again, this view leads us to focus on the relationship between Euro\ pe)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(and the United States.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0155 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (There has been a fair degree of disagreement among observers of trans-)Tj 0.0807 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (atlantic relations about the basis of the idea of the West. Some, such a\ s)Tj 0.08099 Tw T*(Owen Harries, view the notion of the West as an expedient of the Cold)Tj 0.3019 Tw T*(War, created by American and European policymakers to strengthen)Tj 0.00529 Tc -0.0054 Tw T*(popular resistance to encroaching communist powers.)Tj 0.0054 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 355.4017 331.0363 Tm (32)Tj 0.00529 Tc -0.0054 Tw 9 0 0 9 364.763 327.8862 Tm (For them, with the)Tj 0.00481 Tc -0.0049 Tw -26.489 -1.2778 Td (Cold War over, the West as an ideational construct will collapse, leadin\ g to)Tj 0.0141 Tc -0.01421 Tw T*(the disintegration of NATO and increasing divergence in the interests an\ d)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.18781 Tw T*(identities of Europeans and Americans. The divisions within the West)Tj 0.1097 Tw T*(regarding war with Iraq in 2003 \320 though, importantly, not speci\336c\ ally)Tj 0.0089 Tw T*(between the United States and a united Europe \320 seem to lend support \ to)Tj 0.0071 Tc -0.0072 Tw T*(the pessimistic view. Others such as Miles Kahler think that the roots o\ f an)Tj -0.00729 Tw T*(idea of Western civilization run deeper, given America\325s European anc\ estry)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.19341 Tw T*(and Europe\325s growing experience with American cultural exports even)Tj 0.0986 Tw T*(before the Second World War.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 261.0259 227.5363 Tm (33)Tj 0.0986 Tw 9 0 0 9 271.5674 224.3862 Tm (From a different point of view, Samuel)Tj 0.0211 Tw -16.1339 -1.2778 Td (Huntington\325s notion of a \322clash of civilizations\323 also sees a s\ trong future)Tj 0.0154 Tc -0.0155 Tw T*(for the West in the face of other hostile civilizations, a thesis that, \ despite)Tj 0.0078 Tc -0.0079 Tw T*(most analysts\325 derision at the time of publication, has received much\ more)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(attention since September 11, 2001.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 278.526 181.5363 Tm (34)Tj 0.0257 Tc 0.04469 Tw 9 0 0 9 135.3621 166.8863 Tm (Given the cultural content of trade and investment, we might expect)Tj 0.10519 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (EU preferences to re\337ect the relative willingness of Europeans to see\ a)Tj 0.0211 Tc -0.0126 Tw T*(cultural convergence with the United States. On the one hand, European)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R12 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 197)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 165 0 obj 6942 endobj 166 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 167 0 obj << /Length 168 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R38 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.0257 Tc 0.1945 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (policymakers intent on maintaining strong cultural and political ties)Tj 0.0137 Tc -0.0052 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(between Europe and the United States might promote new ways to tie the)Tj 0.0257 Tc 0.0899 Tw T*(two sides of the Atlantic together. For example, Britain, which already)Tj 0.04691 Tw T*(shares strong cultural af\336nities with both Europe and the United Stat\ es)Tj 0.14371 Tw T*(\(and Canada\), has been the champion of the idea of a TAFTA, which)Tj 0.06931 Tw T*(could strengthen the conviction among Europeans and Americans that)Tj 0.0654 Tw T*(they share a common cultural space.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 291.9073 572.5363 Tm (35)Tj 0.0654 Tw 9 0 0 9 302.3276 569.3862 Tm (Moreover, despite evidence that)Tj 0.30521 Tw -19.4607 -1.2778 Td (the 9/11 terrorist attacks have not signi\336cantly reasserted U.S. and)Tj -0.0114 Tw T*(European elites\325 fading sense of common cultural bonds, were Europe t\ o)Tj 0.0209 Tc -0.01241 Tw T*(suffer similar attacks, transatlantic solidarity might dig deeper roots \ with)Tj 0.0229 Tc -0.0144 Tw T*(the full realization that the assaults were not just anti-American but f\ un-)Tj 0.0257 Tc 0.04469 Tw T*(damentally anti-Western. In this unhoped-for scenario, terrorism could)Tj 0.01019 Tc -0.00169 Tw T*(serve as a catalyst for the convergence of transatlantic identities and \ inter-)Tj 0.01331 Tc -0.00481 Tw T*(ests through the emerging perception of a shared \322other.\323 In this \ context,)Tj 0.0257 Tc 0.0843 Tw T*(closer economic relations as well as political and security ties becomes\ )Tj 0.01421 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(particularly plausible.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.12621 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (However, the more prominent trend within Europe at least since the)Tj -0.01711 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (inauguration of George W. Bush seemed to be to highlight cultural differ\ -)Tj 0.1427 Tw T*(ences between Europe and the United States. Perhaps embodied in the)Tj 0.1557 Tw T*(forty-third U.S. president, Europeans have increasingly found common)Tj 0.02161 Tw T*(ground amongst themselves in denouncing various practices and institu-)Tj 0.0746 Tw T*(tions that they see as endemic to the American character, including the)Tj 0.0013 Tc -0.0014 Tw T*(death penalty, missile defenses, violent crime, income inequality, \322f\ ranken-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0381 Tw T*(foods,\323 and several others.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 243.1771 377.0363 Tm (36)Tj 0.03799 Tw 9 0 0 9 253.1734 373.8862 Tm (This growing anti-Americanism may also be)Tj 0.37151 Tw -13.9992 -1.2778 Td (connected to a greater skepticism about globalization, which many)Tj 0.01041 Tc -0.0105 Tw T*(Europeans see as a primarily American-driven phenomenon that threatens)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.02721 Tw T*(their relatively generous welfare states \320 a social model that contin\ ues to)Tj 0.07629 Tw T*(defy the Americans\325 sink-or-swim approach to socioeconomic solidarity\ .)Tj 0.0112 Tc -0.01131 Tw T*(More generally, it may be possible to characterize Europe as representin\ g a)Tj 0.0025 Tc -0.00259 Tw T*(\322postmodern\323 society, increasingly postmaterialist and environment\ alist in)Tj 0.0033 Tc -0.0034 Tw T*(nature, while the United States represents a hypermodern society, materi\ al-)Tj 0.0029 Tc -0.00301 Tw T*(ist to its core.)Tj 0.00301 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 183.6886 285.0363 Tm (37)Tj 0.0029 Tc -0.00301 Tw 9 0 0 9 193.0217 281.8862 Tm (Were these characterizations to hold sway, we might expect)Tj 0.0125 Tc -0.0126 Tw -7.3156 -1.2778 Td (Europeans to prefer less than completely free trade with the United Stat\ es,)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0372 Tw T*(as it seeks to maintain its distinct cultural identity \320 embodied in \ its un-)Tj 0.0403 Tw T*(Disney\336ed cultural output, un-McDonaldized diets, and uncompromised)Tj -0.0022 Tw T*(agricultural standards \320 by keeping the United States at arm\325s len\ gth. The)Tj 0.0975 Tw T*(EU\325s reluctance to accept free trade or investment in the entertainme\ nt)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(industry lends support to such a view.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2934 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (This question of transatlantic identities might also \336nd its origins)Tj 0.00259 Tc -0.0027 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (speci\336cally within Europe and the dynamics of European unity. It migh\ t be)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.12241 Tw T*(possible to suggest that the more European leaders focus on deepening)Tj 0.07761 Tw T*(Europe, the less willing they will be to integrate with the United State\ s.)Tj 0.0511 Tw T*(Successful deepening of European institutions requires the ongoing con-)Tj 0.00751 Tc -0.0076 Tw T*(struction of a European identity, an identity that has proven quite dif\336\ cult)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (198)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R38 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 198)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 168 0 obj 7052 endobj 169 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 170 0 obj << /Length 171 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R19 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.0276 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (to imbue among EU citizens. Some have suggested that a convergence of)Tj -0.011 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(European and American identities would of necessity undermine the goal)Tj 0.09579 Tw T*(of \336rst creating the European identity.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 296.8961 618.5363 Tm (38)Tj 0.09579 Tw 9 0 0 9 307.4123 615.3862 Tm (As such, European leaders may)Tj 0.00819 Tc -0.0083 Tw -20.1368 -1.2778 Td (\336nd it expedient to do the opposite, to seek to unite Europe on the b\ ack of)Tj 0.00529 Tc -0.0054 Tw T*(the transatlantic relationship by trumpeting European values as superior\ to)Tj 0.0045 Tc -0.0047 Tw T*(their American counterparts.)Tj 0.00459 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 248.0657 584.0363 Tm (39)Tj -0.0047 Tw 9 0 0 9 257.4178 580.8862 Tm (Henry Kissinger, in a July 2001 interview on)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2419 Tw -14.5819 -1.2778 Td (National Public Radio, accused European elites of doing exactly that.)Tj 0.0159 Tw T*(However, if the dynamics of European unity favor enlargement, with the)Tj 0.013 Tc -0.01311 Tw T*(inclusion of an ever more diverse group of \322new\323 Europeans under t\ he EU)Tj 0.00191 Tc -0.002 Tw T*(umbrella, we might expect a more propitious environment for Western cul-\ )Tj 0.0164 Tc -0.01649 Tw T*(tural convergence \(or at least less divergence\). Indeed, the enlargeme\ nt of)Tj 0.0143 Tc -0.0144 Tw T*(the European Union to the east would bring within the EU countries such)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(as Poland that have tended to demonstrate strongly pro-American views.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.08611 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (In addition to Europe\325s internal identity, we might also consider how\ )Tj 0.14571 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (transatlantic relations respond to the EU\325s ongoing development of an\ )Tj 0.0864 Tw T*(\322international identity\323 \320 and how that international identity \ stands in)Tj 0.175 Tw T*(contrast to that of the United States.)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 297.1225 457.5363 Tm (40)Tj 0.175 Tw 9 0 0 9 308.3508 454.3862 Tm (In an in\337uential essay, Robert)Tj 0.0036 Tc -0.00369 Tw -20.2411 -1.2778 Td (Kagan, an American political commentator, described the contrast between\ )Tj 0.0024 Tc -0.0025 Tw T*(the two: the EU, a \322weak\323 actor born of cooperative multilateralis\ m, seeks a)Tj 0.0087 Tc -0.0088 Tw T*(\322self-contained world of laws and rules based on transnational negoti\ ation)Tj 0.0065 Tc -0.00661 Tw T*(and cooperation,\323 while the United States believes that \322internati\ onal laws)Tj 0.0145 Tc -0.0146 Tw T*(and rules are unreliable\323 and \322true security and the promotion of \ a liberal)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.15331 Tw T*(order still depend on the possession and use of military might.\323)Tj 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 416.9649 388.5363 Tm (41)Tj 9 0 0 9 427.9983 385.3862 Tm (The)Tj 0.15829 Tw -33.5352 -1.2778 Td (Europeans\325 legalistic approach to international relations seems to ha\ ve)Tj 0.23489 Tw T*(emerged from the EU\325s own internal evolution, and can be seen, for)Tj 0.2845 Tw T*(example, in Europeans\325 approach to the international criminal court)Tj 0.0015 Tc -0.0016 Tw T*(\(pooling sovereignty\) and its preference for hard targets in the Kyoto\ proto-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1109 Tw T*(col \(analogous to the economic criteria of EMU\). This approach \336nds\ a)Tj 0.00819 Tc -0.0083 Tw T*(strong contrast in the longstanding American preference for \337exibilit\ y and)Tj 0.0098 Tc -0.0099 Tw T*(freedom of maneuver in international politics, a preference that is part\ icu-)Tj 0.009 Tc -0.00909 Tw T*(larly strong in the current U.S. administration. While Kagan\325s argume\ nt is,)Tj 0.0007 Tc -0.00079 Tw T*(by his own admission, a vast simpli\336cation, his ideas about European \ elites\325)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.242 Tw T*(views of international governance and their basis in Europe\325s unique)Tj 0.00841 Tc -0.0085 Tw T*(postwar experience of integration do identify a clear and substantive po\ int)Tj 0 Tc -0.00011 Tw T*(of difference with the United States, and thus suggest a further roadblo\ ck to)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.12849 Tw T*(their potential ability to see eye to eye on how to govern transatlantic\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(commercial relations.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0652 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (A realist analysis of international relations would lead us to expect an\ )Tj 0.021 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (increasingly coherent EU to maintain the preferences of the strong \320 \ i.e.,)Tj 0.0378 Tw T*(like the United States, for freedom of maneuver to pursue one\325s inter\ ests)Tj 0.1687 Tw T*(and security. However, closer attention to how the EU externalizes an)Tj 0.0143 Tc -0.0144 Tw T*(approach to governance developed through the experience of multilateral)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1077 Tw T*(interactions among its members \(and perhaps networks of concertation)Tj -0.01511 Tw T*(among governments and interest groups within many member countries\))Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 358.5346 663.1211 Tm (Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8.9724 0 Td (199)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R19 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 199)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 171 0 obj 7286 endobj 172 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 173 0 obj << /Length 174 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R15 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.0605 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (may be a better guide to understanding how EU and U.S. perceptions of)Tj 0.01401 Tc -0.0141 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(their interests and prescriptions for behavior in international politics\ may)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.08701 Tw T*(continue to diverge. And if divergence is the order of the day, then the\ )Tj 0.091 Tw T*(absence of an interregional track between Europe and a U.S.-dominated)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(North America would hardly be surprising.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc 0 Tw 10 0 0 10 127.181 566.8862 Tm [(4)-1197.3(Conclusion)]TJ /F2 1 Tf 0.00301 Tc -0.0031 Tw 9 0 0 9 127.181 546.3862 Tm (The commercial relationships that the European Union has developed with)Tj 0.017 Tc -0.01711 Tw T*(the countries of North America are probably the most mutually bene\336ci\ al)Tj 0.0864 Tw T*(transregional commercial ties in human history. While these links have)Tj 0.0681 Tw T*(developed separately, today they form a fairly coherent whole: EU trade)Tj 0.00751 Tc -0.0076 Tw T*(with Canada, Mexico, and the United States is mostly free and unproblem-\ )Tj 0.0024 Tc -0.0025 Tw T*(atic, much like trade among the NAFTA members themselves. So why don\325\ t)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0918 Tw T*(the EU and NAFTA simply formalize this relationship in a Transatlantic)Tj 0.00549 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(Free Trade Area?)Tj 0.0114 Tc -0.01151 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (To some extent, we can explain the absence of transatlantic interregion-\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1479 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (alism from a functionalist standpoint: there is little need for a TAFTA.\ )Tj 0.0137 Tc -0.01379 Tw T*(Speci\336cally, there is no compelling economic rationale for a TAFTA, o\ r for)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.01151 Tw T*(any overarching framework to codify transatlantic economic integration.)Tj 0.01041 Tc -0.0105 Tw T*(Why \336x what, despite some occasional sputterings, is not broken? Ther\ e is)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.03889 Tw T*(also a compelling political rationale not to pursue a formal interregion\ al)Tj -0.0162 Tw T*(relationship. Both the tangible and symbolic repercussions of any but th\ e)Tj 0.1813 Tw T*(most \322open regionalist\323 transatlantic free trade arrangement would\ be)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(quite dire for the rest of the world, especially developing countries.)Tj 0.008 Tc -0.0081 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (But functionalist approaches are not suf\336cient to help us understand \ the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1508 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (source of European trade preferences and how they are translated into)Tj 0.00771 Tc -0.0078 Tw T*(interregional outcomes. The problem is that it is dif\336cult to identif\ y which)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.23759 Tw T*(of the four hypotheses is most convincing in its explanation for the)Tj 0.0425 Tw T*(absence of a viable EU\320NAFTA track; in none of the four do the releva\ nt)Tj 0.0076 Tc -0.00771 Tw T*(factors suggest that the EU should clearly be pursuing transatlantic int\ erre-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(gionalism. However, some do seem better than others.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2303 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Least illuminating is the interest group hypothesis. This hypothesis)Tj 0.05611 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (assumes that if a certain outcome is consistent with the preferences of \ a)Tj 0.0062 Tw T*(decisive set of interest groups, they will mobilize \(i.e., lobby\) to g\ ain that)Tj 0.0166 Tc -0.01669 Tw T*(outcome. Though the relevant incentive exists, effective mobilization ha\ s)Tj 0.01511 Tc -0.0152 Tw T*(been absent, and an interest group explanation cannot effectively explai\ n)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.07829 Tw T*(outcomes unless its assumption of mobilization holds. The main reason)Tj 0.00951 Tc -0.0096 Tw T*(why pro-free trade groups have not mobilized for a TAFTA lies in the mod\ -)Tj 0.00751 Tc -0.0076 Tw T*(erate size of the potential gain: the status quo is more or less accepta\ ble for)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1725 Tw T*(most of them, while a TAFTA might not bring a large return on their)Tj 0.0118 Tc -0.0119 Tw T*(investment in mobilization. However, particularly in its relations with \ the)Tj 0.017 Tc -0.01711 Tw T*(United States and Canada, European of\336cials have in the TABD and CERT\ )Tj 0.0069 Tc -0.007 Tw T*(sought to privilege and amplify the voices of pro-liberalization groups \ \(i.e.,)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (200)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R15 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 200)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 174 0 obj 6629 endobj 175 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 176 0 obj << /Length 177 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R10 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.0041 Tc -0.0042 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (to reduce their costs of mobilization\), and yet these groups, despite t\ he fact)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1044 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(a TAFTA would clearly be in their interest, have not generated political\ )Tj 0.01041 Tc -0.0105 Tw T*(momentum for it. But their failure to do so cannot be found in the disse\ nt)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0489 Tw T*(of anti-liberalization groups, which are much more concerned about the)Tj 0.07491 Tw T*(possible adjustments necessary in agreements with less developed coun-)Tj 0.03259 Tw T*(tries. Ultimately, TAFTA would be more of a )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 21.7739 0 Td (political )Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.03259 Tw 3.9844 0 Td (project than a com-)Tj 0.0119 Tc -0.01199 Tw -25.7583 -1.2778 Td (mercial one. In already accessible markets such as those of North Americ\ a,)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2079 Tw T*(European business groups\325 relatively narrow focus may allow them to)Tj -0.0036 Tw T*(advocate successfully for technical, sector-speci\336c agreements such a\ s the)Tj 0.0307 Tw T*(MRAs, but they do not have a suf\336ciently broad worldview to be the ke\ y)Tj -0.00681 Tw T*(drivers behind a political project like TAFTA. Thus even if European \336\ rms)Tj 0.1118 Tw T*(and industries mobilized more strongly for a TAFTA, it is doubtful that)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(their advocacy alone would suf\336ce to bring the EU to pursue it.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0789 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The European Commission, for its part, has never been known to shy)Tj 0.03371 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (away from a political project. Its interest in a TAFTA, and the Council \ of)Tj 0.0157 Tc -0.01579 Tw T*(Ministers\325 disinclination to allow the Commission to pursue that inte\ rest,)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0051 Tw T*(can indeed help us understand to some extent why the Union as a whole)Tj 0.0166 Tc -0.01669 Tw T*(has not gone down the interregional path with NAFTA. Simply put, when)Tj 0.01559 Tc -0.0157 Tw T*(push comes to shove the Council still gets what it wants. Given the incr\ e-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0381 Tw T*(mentalism that generally characterizes changes in the balance of institu\ -)Tj 0.1828 Tw T*(tional power in the EU, even in the face of new members and a new)Tj 0 Tc -0.00011 Tw T*(constitution, this approach also provides a clear prediction that the ab\ sence)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.01311 Tw T*(of an EU\320NAFTA track is likely to continue well into the future. Howe\ ver,)Tj 0.0013 Tw T*(in its neglect of factors external to Europe \320 notably the characteri\ stics of)Tj 0.01151 Tc -0.0116 Tw T*(the counterpart region \320 this hypothesis can only give us a partial a\ ccount)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(of the dynamics of this relationship.)Tj 0.0116 Tc -0.0117 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Greater attention to the international power dynamics involves starts to\ )Tj 0.0139 Tc -0.01401 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (bring into focus a big part of what is truly unique about transatlantic \ rela-)Tj 0.0047 Tc -0.00481 Tw T*(tions. Europe\325s commercial relationship with NAFTA cannot be understo\ od)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0166 Tw T*(outside the context of EU\320U.S. relations more generally. As the two g\ reat)Tj 0.00169 Tc -0.0018 Tw T*(centers of economic power in a world in which globalized market forces a\ re)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0009 Tw T*(increasingly rede\336ning the rules of engagement among nations, the nee\ d)Tj 0.0108 Tc -0.01089 Tw T*(to secure export markets for the vitality of European producers and for \ the)Tj 0.0126 Tc -0.0127 Tw T*(sake of domestic prosperity has become a primary strategic goal of the E\ U.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.06371 Tw T*(The United States, whether in its creation of NAFTA, APEC, or an FTAA,)Tj 0.00529 Tc -0.0054 Tw T*(presents a challenge to this European goal. In this context, access to p\ oten-)Tj 0.0116 Tc -0.0117 Tw T*(tially lucrative markets is relative, and, as its rationale for pursuing\ an FTA)Tj 0.0074 Tc -0.00751 Tw T*(with Mexico \(among others\) suggests, the EU is very much concerned wit\ h)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.24091 Tw T*(its position relative to the United States. If we were to consider this)Tj 0.0005 Tc -0.0006 Tw T*(approach together with a focus on EU institutions, we might \336nd a per\ suas-)Tj 0.00031 Tc -0.0004 Tw T*(ive interpretation in the idea that the Council\325s aloofness from the \ idea of a)Tj 0.0009 Tc -0.00101 Tw T*(TAFTA may derive in large part from its representation of national opini\ ons)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.01469 Tw T*(that in some cases see the EU\325s main purpose to be as a counterweight\ to)Tj 0.14211 Tw T*(American power. Trade is a primary means by which economic power,)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 358.5346 663.1211 Tm (Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8.9724 0 Td (201)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R10 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 201)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 177 0 obj 6985 endobj 178 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 179 0 obj << /Length 180 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R79 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.0811 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (in\337uence, and prosperity are redistributed across nations, and by whi\ ch)Tj 0.008 Tc -0.0081 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(\322national\323 champions are created. Moreover, given the EU\325s glar\ ing inabil-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0546 Tw T*(ity to realize a common foreign and security policy \320 and the increas\ ing)Tj 0.00661 Tc -0.0067 Tw T*(gap between EU and U.S. military capabilities \320 external commercial p\ olicy)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.00861 Tw T*(is the realistic locus of Europe\325s pursuit of relative material gain.\ Through)Tj 0.01289 Tc -0.013 Tw T*(this lens, a particularly clear picture of the limited prospects of TAFT\ A can)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(be discerned.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.10941 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (As for the constructivist hypothesis, it is dif\336cult to draw direct l\ ines)Tj 0.0195 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (from questions of ideas, identities, and culture to those of trade relat\ ion-)Tj -0.0002 Tw T*(ships. Yet given the cultural content of trade, and the current fascinat\ ion)Tj 0.0024 Tc -0.0025 Tw T*(among some European and American analysts with the seeming divergence)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2951 Tw T*(between the commonly-held values in their \(two?\) civilizations, this)Tj 0.0139 Tc -0.01401 Tw T*(hypothesis is particularly hard to ignore in this case. Surely a shared \ sense)Tj 0.0121 Tc -0.01221 Tw T*(of identity is not a suf\336cient condition for the creation of an inter\ regional)Tj 0.00169 Tc -0.0018 Tw T*(commercial relationship, nor is its absence suf\336cient to destroy inte\ rregion-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.04449 Tw T*(alism\325s prospects. Yet the presence of an EU struggling to de\336ne b\ oth its)Tj 0.1353 Tw T*(internal identity and its external identity, and the omnipresence of an)Tj 0.0679 Tw T*(American superpower that insists on going its own way in international)Tj 0.0575 Tw T*(affairs, clearly provide a powerful incentive for the EU to de\336ne its\ elf in)Tj 0.00661 Tc -0.0067 Tw T*(contrast to the bullying hegemon \320 and a powerful disincentive to tie\ itself)Tj 0.0072 Tc -0.00729 Tw T*(more closely to it. While such a proposition is dif\336cult to substanti\ ate, and)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.13341 Tw T*(may be highly contingent on the parties and personalities in power in)Tj 0.0089 Tc -0.009 Tw T*(Washington and European capitals at any given time, it cannot be ignored\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(in the current transatlantic political climate. )Tj 0.0089 Tc -0.009 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Stepping back from these hypotheses, a key question for whether the EU)Tj 0.0159 Tc -0.01601 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (will press for an interregional relationship with NAFTA as opposed to se\ p-)Tj 0.0164 Tc -0.01649 Tw T*(arate bilateral tracks with the United States, Mexico, and Canada depend\ s)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.015 Tw T*(on whether the EU sees a major overlap in what it wants )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 27.7979 0 Td (vis-\210-vis )Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.015 Tw 4.0451 0 Td (each of)Tj 0.15131 Tw -31.8429 -1.2778 Td (the three NAFTA countries and a prospective FTAA. Certainly the EU\325s)Tj 0.0161 Tc -0.0162 Tw T*(interest in Mexico \320 gaining access to protected sectors and redressi\ ng the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.05701 Tw T*(eroded terms of trade for the EU resulting from NAFTA \320 is closer to \ the)Tj 0.01199 Tc -0.0121 Tw T*(EU\325s interest in the rest of Latin America \(and indeed the rest of t\ he devel-)Tj 0.0063 Tc -0.00639 Tw T*(oping world\) than it is to the need to maintain access and reduce techn\ ical)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.06039 Tw T*(barriers to trade with the United States and Canada. Because the EU has)Tj 0.0168 Tc -0.01691 Tw T*(already established itself in Latin America through deals with Mexico an\ d)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.03169 Tw T*(MERCOSUR, the only apparent reasons to deal with NAFTA as a regional)Tj 0.0112 Tc -0.01131 Tw T*(entity would be if \(1\) the EU could get a better deal from the United \ States)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0818 Tw T*(if Mexico and Canada were involved, or \(2\) if the FTAA process were to\ )Tj 0.0177 Tw T*(falter and intra-NAFTA integration were to move forward \(perhaps in the\ )Tj 0.1747 Tw T*(absence of progress in multilateral talks\). The \336rst scenario is unl\ ikely)Tj 0.0188 Tw T*(because Washington would almost certainly seek to avoid having its bar-)Tj 0.0052 Tc -0.00529 Tw T*(gaining freedom circumscribed by the involvement of Canada and Mexico.)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0065 Tw T*(The second scenario is perhaps more plausible, though one imagines that)Tj -0.01711 Tw T*(the United States would do whatever necessary to avoid the simultaneous)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (202)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R79 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 202)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 180 0 obj 6966 endobj 181 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 182 0 obj << /Length 183 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R56 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.00681 Tc -0.0069 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (collapse of both WTO and FTAA negotiations, and would sooner accelerate)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(its pursuit of bilateral trade deals than retreat \324inward\325 into NA\ FTA.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0507 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Ultimately, any inquiry of EU\320U.S. trade relations must recognize tha\ t)Tj 0.47681 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (transatlantic trade relations are already so deep, and the web of)Tj 0.0249 Tw T*(U.S.\320European commercial, social, cultural, and political relationshi\ ps so)Tj -0.0172 Tw T*(dense, that if there were any inherent need for an overarching framework\ )Tj 0.06689 Tw T*(for transregional trade and economic relations, one would already exist.\ )Tj 0.01469 Tc -0.0148 Tw T*(Therefore, these existing conditions suggest that the impetus for a chan\ ge)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.00369 Tw T*(in the status of these relations would have to be powerful, sustained, a\ nd)Tj 0.0369 Tw T*(unambiguous. Of all the EU\325s relationships with other regions, that w\ ith)Tj 0.0899 Tw T*(North America is probably the one in which the region-to-region status)Tj 0.0047 Tc -0.00481 Tw T*(quo is such that there is little to be gained from establishing a formal\ inter-)Tj 0.00591 Tc -0.006 Tw T*(regional arrangement. The EU as a whole does quite well out of the curre\ nt)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1032 Tw T*(state of affairs \320 mostly unproblematic access to the U.S. and Canadi\ an)Tj 0.0007 Tc -0.00079 Tw T*(markets, and a free trade area with Mexico \320 and the rest of the worl\ d is not)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(excluded from any preferential arrangement among the world\325s largest \ and)Tj T*(most prosperous markets.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0085 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Given the economically rational basis of the status quo, a TAFTA could)Tj 0.0632 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (really be possible only if a transformative event realigned preferences \ in)Tj 0.0127 Tc -0.0128 Tw T*[(such a way as to create a new political)-287(rationale for an interregional agree-)]TJ 0.0047 Tc -0.00481 Tw T*(ment. Absent such an event, there seems little impetus for the creation \ of a)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0038 Tw T*(TAFTA \320 whether from interest groups, EU institutions, power politics\ , or)Tj 0.23019 Tw T*(cultural/identity considerations. Some of these factors are better than)Tj 0.0041 Tc -0.0042 Tw T*(others for explaining the past and predicting the future of any formal i\ nsti-)Tj 0.0114 Tc -0.01151 Tw T*(tutionalization of the EU\320NAFTA commercial relationship. And given th\ at)Tj 0.0101 Tc -0.01019 Tw T*(9/11 was not suf\336ciently transformative to create this new political \ ration-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.16769 Tw T*(ale for a TAFTA, it is probably best for European and North American)Tj 0.009 Tc -0.00909 Tw T*(of\336cials to hope that no truly transformative event does occur. Ultim\ ately,)Tj 0.0135 Tc -0.0136 Tw T*(the absence of formal interregionalism is not an indicator of the ill-he\ alth)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2852 Tw T*(of transatlantic relations \320 but its future presence would likely be \ a)Tj 0.002 Tc -0.00211 Tw T*(re\337ection of a more parlous state for world politics and/or the inter\ national)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(economy as a whole.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 2.7778 TL T*(Notes)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.047 Tw 8 0 0 8 130.8188 243.8862 Tm [(1)11.5(.)-536.6(I would like to thank Justin Kolbeck, Matthew Odette, Daniel Xu, and Dev\ on)]TJ 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 1.4203 -1.25 Td (Rackle for their energetic and insightful research assistance.)Tj -1.4203 -1.25 Td [(2.)-548.1(Kahler 1996.)]TJ 1.25 TL T*[(3.)-548.1(Lamy 1999b.)]TJ T*[(4.)-548.1(Burghardt 2001.)]TJ T*[(5.)-548.1(Blinken 2001.)]TJ T*[(6.)-548.1(Lamy 2000.)]TJ T*[(7.)-548.1(Blackwill and Archick 1998.)]TJ T*[(8.)-548.1(European Commission 2000.)]TJ T*[(9.)-548.1(European Commission 2000.)]TJ -0.5797 -1.25 Td [(10.)-548.1(Gower 2000.)]TJ /F3 1 Tf 29.0442 64.9044 Td (Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8.9724 0 Td (203)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R56 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 203)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 183 0 obj 6246 endobj 184 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 185 0 obj << /Length 186 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R95 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 0 Tr 8 0 0 8 127.181 639.1212 Tm [(11.)-548.1(Gower 2000.)]TJ 1.25 TL T*[(12.)-548.1(\322Canada seeks deal with EU,\323 )]TJ /F3 1 Tf 16.146 0 Td (The Gazette)Tj /F2 1 Tf 5.2588 0 Td (, 17 April 2001.)Tj -21.4048 -1.25 Td [(13.)-548.1(Council of Europe 2000.)]TJ 0.00571 Tc T*[(14.)-548(In some circles in the United Kingdom, however, the welcome idea of clos\ er ties)]TJ 0.01711 Tc 0.01511 Tw 2 -1.25 Td (with a North American community has converged with anti-EU sentiments to\ )Tj 0.1537 Tw T*(generate a different angle on Canadian ideas of closer partnership. A wa\ rm)Tj 0.1179 Tw T*(reception has been given to a few powerful North American voices \(notab\ ly)Tj 0.1096 Tw T*(Conrad Black, the Canadian-born owner of the London )Tj /F3 1 Tf 27.9501 0 Td (Daily Telegraph)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.1097 Tw 7.2771 0 Td (, and)Tj 0.0407 Tw -35.2272 -1.25 Td (former U.S. senator Phil Gramm\) calling for the United Kingdom to leave\ the)Tj 0.01241 Tc -0.0125 Tw T*(European Union and join NAFTA. While this heterodox view has never made \ it)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.01089 Tw T*(into the mainstream of political discourse in the United Kingdom, Lamy f\ elt it)Tj 0.2361 Tw T*(necessary in a mid-2000 speech to acknowledge and then to criticize this\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw T*(viewpoint.)Tj -0.00571 Tw -2 -1.25 Td [(15.)-548.1(DTI 2001.)]TJ 0.0009 Tc -0.00101 Tw T*[(16.)-552.8(One open question here is, of course, whether NAFTA would itself \322dis\ appear\323 as)]TJ 0.01711 Tc 0.08611 Tw 2 -1.25 Td (a separate entity within an FTAA, or whether it would continue to exist \ as a)Tj 0.00529 Tc -0.0054 Tw T*(nested arrangement under the FTAA. This question will likely remain open\ until)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(FTAA negotiations progress further.)Tj -2 -1.25 Td [(17.)-548.1(Sbragia 2001.)]TJ T*[(18.)-548.1(Council of Europe 2000, pp. 17\32018.)]TJ T*[(19.)-548.1(Council of Europe 2000, p. 6.)]TJ T*[(20.)-548.1(Lamy 1999a.)]TJ T*[(21.)-548.1(\322Thrashing around,\323 )]TJ /F3 1 Tf 12.0537 0 Td (The Economist)Tj /F2 1 Tf 6.4604 0 Td (, 1 June 2002.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0 Tw -18.5142 -1.25 Td [(2)11.5(2)11.5(.)-536.6(The )]TJ /F3 1 Tf 0.0168 Tw 4.1362 0 Td (New York Times )Tj /F2 1 Tf 7.7211 0 Td (identi\336ed U.S.\320EU disagreements on this issue as based in)Tj 0.00369 Tc -0.0038 Tw -9.8574 -1.25 Td (fundamental philosophical differences regarding the \322precautionary pr\ inciple\323 \320)Tj 0.00391 Tc -0.004 Tw T*(i.e., whether GMOs must be scienti\336cally proven \322innocent\323 befo\ re they may be)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.024 Tw T*(imported or proven \322guilty\323 before their import could be banned. T\ he United)Tj -0.0128 Tw T*(States takes the latter position, the EU the former. )Tj /F3 1 Tf 24.2883 0 Td (The New York Times, )Tj /F2 1 Tf 9.926 0 Td (25 May)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw -34.2143 -1.25 Td (2003.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1657 Tw -2 -1.25 Td [(2)11.5(3)11.5(.)-536.6(\322Dangerous activities,\323 )]TJ /F3 1 Tf 0.1658 Tw 13.7057 0 Td (The Economist, )Tj /F2 1 Tf 7.5551 0 Td (11 May 2002. As of November 2003,)Tj 0.0513 Tw -19.2608 -1.25 Td (however, this con\337ict returned after the WTO upheld a ruling in favor\ of the )Tj 0.1613 Tw T*[(EU, and the EU)-304.3(threatened retaliation against politically sensitive American)]TJ 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw T*(products.)Tj -0.00571 Tw -2 -1.25 Td [(24.)-548.1(Gower 2000, pp. 3\3204.)]TJ 0 Tc -0.00011 Tw T*[(2)-5.6(5)-5.6(.)-553.7(According to Meunier 2000, \322trade policy remains one of the last bast\ ions of sole)]TJ 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2 -1.25 Td (Council legislative power.\323)Tj -2 -1.25 Td [(26.)-548.1(Council of Europe 2000, p. 3.)]TJ T*[(27.)-548.1(Meunier 2000, pp. 82\32083.)]TJ T*[(28.)-548.1(Cadot and Webber 2002.)]TJ T*[(29.)-548.1(See Faust\325s chapter in this volume for more on the EU\320MERCOSUR rel\ ationship.)]TJ 0.01711 Tc 0.23289 Tw T*[(3)11.5(0)11.5(.)-536.6(In a document reporting the conclusion of negotiations with Mexico, the)]TJ 0.07001 Tw 2 -1.25 Td (Commission repeatedly couches the bene\336ts of the agreement in terms o\ f its)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(value as a response to NAFTA. See European Commission 2000.)Tj 0.0029 Tc -0.00301 Tw -2 -1.25 Td [(31.)-550.8(Of course, other arguments can be made to explain the lack of recent pro\ gress in)]TJ 0.0166 Tc -0.01669 Tw 2 -1.25 Td (APEC and ASEM, notably the disruption of the 1998 Asian economic crisis \ and)Tj 0.01331 Tc -0.0134 Tw T*(the restarting of multilateral trade negotiations after 1999. See Gilson\ \325s chapter)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0486 Tw T*(in this volume for a comprehensive discussion of ASEM. Regarding APEC, s\ ee)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(Aggarwal and Morrison 1998.)Tj -2 -1.25 Td [(32.)-548.1(Harries 1993.)]TJ T*[(33.)-548.1(Kahler 1996.)]TJ T*[(34.)-548.1(Huntington 1996.)]TJ 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw -65.5 TL T*(204)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R95 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 204)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 186 0 obj 7141 endobj 187 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 188 0 obj << /Length 189 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R2 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.0164 Tc -0.01649 Tw 0 Tr 8 0 0 8 126.1811 639.1212 Tm [(3)10.8(5)10.8(.)-537.3(This viewpoint runs in the tradition of Deutsch\325s \(1957\) \322transa\ ctionalism,\323 in)]TJ 0.01711 Tc 0.0341 Tw 2 -1.25 Td (which repeated interactions among peoples generate a greater sense of sh\ ared)Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw 1.25 TL T*(identity.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1192 Tw -2 -1.25 Td [(3)11.5(6)11.5(.)-536.6(Kagan \(2002\), for one, has claimed that a U.S.\320European divergence \ is )]TJ /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 37.3606 0 Td (not )Tj /F2 1 Tf 0 Tc 1.8805 0 Td (a)Tj 0.0063 Tc -0.00639 Tw -37.2411 -1.25 Td (function of the temporary effects of ideological differences among rulin\ g parties)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(or speci\336c leaders.)Tj -2 -1.25 Td [(37.)-548.1(On postmaterialism, see Inglehart 1988.)]TJ T*[(38.)-548.1(Waever 1998.)]TJ 0.0004 Tc -0.006 Tw T*[(3)11.4(9)11.4(.)-586.6(Pascal Lamy remarked that the best way to get a rousing ovation in the E\ uropean)]TJ -0.01131 Tc -0.00549 Tw 2 -1.25 Td (Parliament these days is to denounce the United States. The )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 27.4244 0 Td (Economist)Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.0054 Tw 4.3577 0 Td (, 7 July 2001.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.3504 Tw -33.7821 -1.25 Td [(4)11.5(0)11.5(.)-536.6(Manners \(2002, pp. 240\3201\) has located the source of \322normative p\ ower)]TJ 0.0061 Tc -0.0062 Tw 2 -1.25 Td (Europe\325s\323 international identity in three factors: \(1\) the histo\ rical context of the)Tj 0.0085 Tc -0.00861 Tw T*(postwar need to overcome nationalism; \(2\) the \322hybrid polity\323 of\ supranational)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.3181 Tw T*(and intergovernmental institutions that \322transcends Westphalian norms\ \323; )Tj 0.0804 Tw T*(and \(3\) Europe\325s \322political-legal constitution,\323 which enshri\ nes the norms of)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(democracy, human rights, and social justice.)Tj -2 -1.25 Td [(41.)-548.1(Kagan 2002.)]TJ /F4 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 9 0 0 9 126.1811 451.9211 Tm (References)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.10809 Tw 8 0 0 8 126.1811 438.9211 Tm (Aggarwal, Vinod K. and Charles E. Morrison, eds. \(1998\). )Tj /F3 1 Tf 28.7196 0 Td (Asia\320Paci\336c Crossroads:)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw -27.7196 -1.25 Td (Regime Creation and the Future of APEC. )Tj /F2 1 Tf 18.3727 0 Td (New York: St. Martin\325s Press.)Tj 0.01311 Tc -0.0132 Tw -19.3727 -1.25 Td (Blackwill, Robert D. and Kristin Archick \(1998\). \322U.S.\320European \ economic relations)Tj 0.0134 Tc -0.0135 Tw 1 -1.25 Td (and world trade.\323 Paper presented at a meeting of the Independent Tas\ k Force on)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2652 Tw T*(the Future of Transatlantic Relations, sponsored by the Council on Forei\ gn)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(Relations, Washington, DC \(April 15\).)Tj 0.0154 Tc -0.0155 Tw -1 -1.25 Td (Blinken, Anthony \(2001\). \322The false crisis in transatlantic relatio\ ns.\323 )Tj /F3 1 Tf 33.179 0 Td (Foreign Affairs)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw -32.179 -1.25 Td (May/June, pp. 35\32048.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2851 Tw -1 -1.25 Td (Burghardt, Guenter \(2001\). \322Prospects for EU\320U.S. trade relation\ s.\323 Speech to)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 1 -1.25 Td (Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University. Durham, NC \(15 Feb\ ruary\).)Tj 0.0025 Tc -0.00259 Tw -1 -1.25 Td (Cadot, Olivier and Douglas Webber \(2002\). \322Banana splits: policy pr\ ocess, particular-)Tj 0.00259 Tc -0.0027 Tw 1 -1.25 Td (istic interests, political capture, and money in transatlantic trade pol\ itics.\323 )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0027 Tc 0 Tw 35.0475 0 Td (Business)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw -35.0475 -1.25 Td (and Politics )Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 5.4005 0 Td (4, 1: 5\32040.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.11 Tw -6.4005 -1.25 Td (Council of Europe \(2000\). \322Prospects for a new transatlantic trade \ relationship.\323)Tj 0.4514 Tw 1 -1.25 Td (Report of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development to the)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(Parliamentary Assembly \(6 June\).)Tj 0.03371 Tc 0.0146 Tw -1 -1.25 Td (Department of Trade and Industry, United Kingdom \(DTI\) \(2001\). \322W\ orld trade)Tj 0.2052 Tw 1 -1.25 Td (and international trade rules: North America.\323 www.dti.gov.uk/worldtr\ ade/)Tj ET 0 0 0 1 K 0.4 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 331.802 267.921 m 444.181 267.921 l S BT /R2 gs 0.0222 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 134.1811 258.9211 Tm (namerica.htm)Tj ET /R18 gs 134.181 257.921 m 188.6 257.921 l S BT /R2 gs 0 Tc 8 0 0 8 188.7785 258.9211 Tm (.)Tj 0.0168 Tc -0.01691 Tw -7.8247 -1.25 Td (Deutsch, K. et al. \(1957\). )Tj /F3 1 Tf 12.1167 0 Td (Political Community and the North Atlantic Area)Tj /F2 1 Tf 22.0764 0 Td (. Princeton,)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw -33.1931 -1.25 Td (NJ: Princeton University Press.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2097 Tw -1 -1.25 Td (European Commission \(2002\). \322Bilateral trade relations: Mexico.\323\ www.europa.)Tj ET /R18 gs 393.551 227.921 m 444.181 227.921 l S BT /R2 gs 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 134.1811 218.9211 Tm (eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral/mex.htm)Tj ET /R18 gs 134.181 217.921 m 277.132 217.921 l S BT /R2 gs 0 Tc 8 0 0 8 277.1782 218.9211 Tm (.)Tj 0.004 Tc -0.0041 Tw -18.8746 -1.25 Td (European Commission \(DG Trade\) \(2000\). Communication from the Commis\ sion to)Tj 0.0049 Tc -0.005 Tw 1 -1.25 Td (the Council and the European Parliament accompanying the \336nal text of\ the draft)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 1.25 TL T*(decisions by the EC\320Mexico Joint Council. Brussels \(18 January\).)Tj 0.00681 Tc -0.0069 Tw -1 -1.25 Td (Gower, Matthew \(2000\). \322Titans of trade: signing free-trade deals w\ ith heavyweights)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1357 Tw 1 -1.25 Td (like North America and the European Union has placed Mexico on the world\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(stage.\323 American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico \(1 October\).)Tj -0.0099 Tc -0.0069 Tw -1 -1.25 Td (Harries, Owen \(1993\). \322The collapse of \324the West.\325\323 )Tj /F3 1 Tf 23.4637 0 Td (Foreign Affairs )Tj /F2 1 Tf 0 Tw 6.4857 0 Td (\(September/October\):)Tj -0.01089 Tc -28.9494 -1.25 Td (41\32053.)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 28.0442 65.525 Td (Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8.9724 0 Td (205)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R2 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 205)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 189 0 obj 8300 endobj 190 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 191 0 obj << /Length 192 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R18 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R86 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.13049 Tw 0 Tr 8 0 0 8 127.181 639.1212 Tm (Huntington, Samuel \(1996\). )Tj /F3 1 Tf 14.2202 0 Td (The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World)Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw -13.2202 -1.25 Td (Order. )Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.00571 Tw 3.0086 0 Td (New York: Simon and Schuster.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0321 Tw -4.0086 -1.25 Td (Inglehart, Ronald \(1988\). \322The Renaissance of political culture.\323\ )Tj /F3 1 Tf 31.4535 0 Td (American Political)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw -30.4535 -1.25 Td (Science Review)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 6.6679 0 Td (82, 4: 1120\3201130.)Tj 0.0056 Tc -7.6679 -1.25 Td (Kagan, Robert \(2002\). \322Power and weakness.\323 )Tj /F3 1 Tf 21.6668 0 Td (Policy Review )Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 6.1802 0 Td (113.)Tj -0.00011 Tc -27.8469 -1.25 Td (Kahler, Miles \(1996\). \322Revision and prevision: historical interpret\ ation and the future)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0717 Tw 1 -1.25 Td (of the transatlantic relationship.\323 In )Tj /F3 1 Tf 18.1769 0 Td (Europe and America: A Return to History)Tj /F2 1 Tf 18.7332 0 Td (, by)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw -36.9101 -1.25 Td (Miles Kahler and Werner Link. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.)Tj -1 -1.25 Td (Lamy, Pascal \(2000\). Speech to Confederation of British Industry. Lond\ on \(6 July\).)Tj 0.0127 Tc -0.0128 Tw 1.25 TL T*(Lamy, Pascal \(1999b\). \322U.S.\320EU relations \320 bilateral and mult\ ilateral issues.\323 Speech)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 1 -1.25 Td (to European\320American Business Council. Washington, DC \(14 October\).\ )Tj -1 -1.25 Td (Lamy, Pascal \(1999a\). Speech to Transatlantic Business Dialogue. Bruss\ els \(23 May\).)Tj 0.00279 Tc -0.0029 Tw T*(Manners, Ian \(2002\). \322Normative power Europe: a contradiction in te\ rms?\323 )Tj /F3 1 Tf -0.00301 Tw 35.467 0 Td (Journal of)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw -34.467 -1.25 Td (Common Market Studies )Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 11.0243 0 Td (40, 2: 235\320258.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1355 Tw -12.0243 -1.25 Td (Meunier, Sophie \(2000\). \322What single voice? European institutions a\ nd EU\320U.S.)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 1 -1.25 Td (trade negotiations.\323 )Tj /F3 1 Tf 9.6381 0 Td (International Organization )Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 12.048 0 Td (54, 1: 103\32035.)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0014 Tw -22.686 -1.25 Td (Sbragia, Alberta \(2001\). \322European Union and NAFTA.\323 In )Tj /F3 1 Tf 28.282 0 Td (European Union and New)Tj 0.0005 Tc -0.0006 Tw -27.282 -1.25 Td (Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic E\ ra)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.0004 Tc 33.8645 0 Td (, edited by)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw -33.8645 -1.25 Td (Mario Tel\230. Aldershot: Ashgate.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.11971 Tw -1 -1.25 Td (W\276ver, Ole \(1998\). \322Integration as security: constructing a Euro\ pe at peace.\323 In)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.1098 Tw 1 -1.25 Td (Atlantic Security)Tj /F2 1 Tf 7.5053 0 Td (, edited by Charles A. Kupchan. New York: Council on Foreign)Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw -7.5053 -1.25 Td (Relations.)Tj 0.00571 Tc -1 29.25 Td (206)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R18 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R86 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (09EUTS-CH07\(180-206\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 206)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R18 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 192 0 obj 5277 endobj xref 0 193 0000000003 65535 f 0000000016 00000 n 0000000362 00000 n 0000000004 00001 f 0000000012 00001 f 0000000519 00000 n 0000001296 00000 n 0000002149 00000 n 0000002997 00000 n 0000003787 00000 n 0000003879 00000 n 0000004025 00000 n 0000000013 00001 f 0000000015 00001 f 0000004373 00000 n 0000000016 00001 f 0000000018 00001 f 0000004710 00000 n 0000000019 00001 f 0000000021 00001 f 0000005047 00000 n 0000000022 00001 f 0000000024 00001 f 0000005395 00000 n 0000000025 00001 f 0000000027 00001 f 0000005732 00000 n 0000000028 00001 f 0000000030 00001 f 0000006079 00000 n 0000000031 00001 f 0000000033 00001 f 0000006426 00000 n 0000000034 00001 f 0000000036 00001 f 0000006764 00000 n 0000000037 00001 f 0000000039 00001 f 0000007102 00000 n 0000000040 00001 f 0000000044 00001 f 0000007449 00000 n 0000007557 00000 n 0000007704 00000 n 0000000045 00001 f 0000000047 00001 f 0000008042 00000 n 0000000048 00001 f 0000000050 00001 f 0000008390 00000 n 0000000051 00001 f 0000000053 00001 f 0000008727 00000 n 0000000054 00001 f 0000000056 00001 f 0000009075 00000 n 0000000057 00001 f 0000000059 00001 f 0000009413 00000 n 0000000060 00001 f 0000000062 00001 f 0000009751 00000 n 0000000063 00001 f 0000000065 00001 f 0000010099 00000 n 0000000066 00001 f 0000000068 00001 f 0000010437 00000 n 0000000069 00001 f 0000000071 00001 f 0000010775 00000 n 0000000072 00001 f 0000000075 00001 f 0000011123 00000 n 0000011247 00000 n 0000000076 00001 f 0000000078 00001 f 0000011585 00000 n 0000000079 00001 f 0000000081 00001 f 0000011923 00000 n 0000000082 00001 f 0000000084 00001 f 0000012271 00000 n 0000000085 00001 f 0000000087 00001 f 0000012609 00000 n 0000000088 00001 f 0000000090 00001 f 0000012956 00000 n 0000000091 00001 f 0000000000 00001 f 0000013294 00000 n 0000013508 00000 n 0000029862 00000 n 0000030080 00000 n 0000047421 00000 n 0000047648 00000 n 0000065403 00000 n 0000065630 00000 n 0000083765 00000 n 0000083797 00000 n 0000083843 00000 n 0000083908 00000 n 0000083932 00000 n 0000083986 00000 n 0000084053 00000 n 0000084111 00000 n 0000084161 00000 n 0000084199 00000 n 0000084279 00000 n 0000084349 00000 n 0000084477 00000 n 0000084570 00000 n 0000090315 00000 n 0000090338 00000 n 0000090431 00000 n 0000097154 00000 n 0000097177 00000 n 0000097270 00000 n 0000104675 00000 n 0000104698 00000 n 0000104791 00000 n 0000111578 00000 n 0000111601 00000 n 0000111694 00000 n 0000118497 00000 n 0000118520 00000 n 0000118613 00000 n 0000125777 00000 n 0000125800 00000 n 0000125893 00000 n 0000132897 00000 n 0000132920 00000 n 0000133013 00000 n 0000140075 00000 n 0000140098 00000 n 0000140191 00000 n 0000147011 00000 n 0000147034 00000 n 0000147127 00000 n 0000154042 00000 n 0000154065 00000 n 0000154158 00000 n 0000161173 00000 n 0000161196 00000 n 0000161289 00000 n 0000168490 00000 n 0000168513 00000 n 0000168606 00000 n 0000175780 00000 n 0000175803 00000 n 0000175896 00000 n 0000182981 00000 n 0000183004 00000 n 0000183097 00000 n 0000190290 00000 n 0000190313 00000 n 0000190406 00000 n 0000197605 00000 n 0000197628 00000 n 0000197721 00000 n 0000204730 00000 n 0000204753 00000 n 0000204846 00000 n 0000211846 00000 n 0000211869 00000 n 0000211962 00000 n 0000219072 00000 n 0000219095 00000 n 0000219188 00000 n 0000226532 00000 n 0000226555 00000 n 0000226648 00000 n 0000233335 00000 n 0000233358 00000 n 0000233451 00000 n 0000240494 00000 n 0000240517 00000 n 0000240610 00000 n 0000247634 00000 n 0000247657 00000 n 0000247750 00000 n 0000254054 00000 n 0000254077 00000 n 0000254170 00000 n 0000261369 00000 n 0000261392 00000 n 0000261485 00000 n 0000269843 00000 n 0000269866 00000 n 0000269959 00000 n 0000275294 00000 n trailer << /Size 193 /Info 111 0 R /Root 2 0 R /ID[] >> startxref 275317 %%EOF